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Abstract
While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has admirably
commandeered its stewardship of patent law—Congress bestowed the
Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals since
1982—the court has unabashedly extended its reach, unwelcomed, into
commercial law. Camouflaged in the name of patent stewardship, the
Federal Circuit’s foray into commercial law has yielded unexpected and
unjustifiable results. This Article argues that, paradoxically, to maintain its
stewardship of patent law, the Federal Circuit should not invoke patent
law to rationalize its decisions concerning commercial law, which have
dramatically altered established commercial law. This encroachment into
commercial law, which is within the provenance of state law, destabilizes
federalism causing uncertainty in state law. The Federal Circuit must
refrain from encroaching into commercial law as it has no authority to
inject itself into state law making.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider two scenarios: In the first, your client has exhausted her
personal net worth by pumping a total of $10 million in loans into a startup
company she founded. Lately, the startup could not obtain funding from
outside sources. The struggling company, however, still must pay its
employees and essential creditors in order to keep the nascent business in
operation. Neither white knight nor kind angel has come to the rescue. The
client had no other option but to use her own financial resources in making
the necessary loans to the startup. To secure the preexisting loans, the
startup grants the client a security interest in the startup’s patents, pursuant
to a security agreement.
You help draft the agreement and perfect the client’s security interest in
the patents by recording the security interest in all appropriate registration
offices. Subsequently, matters become worse for the struggling company. It
faces a hefty judgment in patent litigation that it asserted earlier against a
third party, and that third party now levies the patents. Armed with your
thorough understanding of secured transaction law and priority rules, you
assist your client with foreclosing on the patents, as you know that under
established secured transaction law, the client has priority over the third
party’s subsequent judicial lien on the patents.
The third party opposes the client’s foreclosure on the patents. The
dispute between your client and the third party finds its way, eventually,
into the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. To your
astonishment, the Federal Circuit holds against your client. Unequivocally,
the court states that your client’s security interest in the patents for the $10
million in loans is a fraudulent transfer of the struggling company’s assets.
In other words, under Federal Circuit law, a grant of security interest in
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patents for preexisting loans is a fraudulent transfer.1
The message delivered by the Federal Circuit in the above scenario will
send chills down the spines of battle-tested founders of startup companies.
It will cause them to think twice before pouring their personal net worth
into their own struggling companies.
In the next scenario, your client wants to acquire a target company
without assuming any attached liability. As an experienced corporate
transactions attorney, you avoid the liability for your client by negotiating a
deal to acquire only the target company’s assets, including patents, for
$500 million. Asset purchases often require extensive due diligence, which
your team of experienced lawyers has labored many hours to complete.
Like any corporate transactions attorney, you know state contract law
very well and employ the best practices in the field. You know that
mistakes made during due diligence can result in some assets not being
properly identified and transferred at closing, and you have, therefore,
drafted the master purchase agreement and ancillary agreements with
utmost care. You include common provisions in these agreements to
retroactively transfer assets that are accidentally left out and subsequently
discovered after closing to have the same effective date for transfer as
stated in the master purchase agreement. After all, the client is paying $500
million for the target company’s assets, and both parties to the transaction
agree that your client is the owner of the assets as of the effective date.
After closing, you learn from the client that it does not have one of the
transferred patents, though the disclosure schedule includes the patent. You
inform the client about the provisions for retroactivity of ownership of any
transferred assets and assuage the client’s concern. The seller immediately
cooperates with you to address the mistake, and the client is happy again,
as it now owns the transferred patent as of the effective date pursuant to the
master purchase agreement. The client’s happiness, however, is shortlived. When the client later asserts a patent infringement action against an
alleged infringer, it faces a challenge mounted by the defendant. The
infringer challenges your client’s standing to bring suit in the first place on
the basis that your client does not own the patent at issue. In its decision,
the Federal Circuit ignores well-established state contract law on
retroactivity of ownership of assets transferred pursuant to a sale and
purchase agreement; it rules that your client was not the owner of the
patent when the complaint was filed because ownership cannot be made
retroactive under the Federal Circuit’s contract law for patents!2
You are speechless. How do you inform the client that their $500
1. See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 148 F. App’x 924, 928–30 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
2. See Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 672 F.3d 1239, 1240–41 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (per curiam); Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1337–
38 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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million acquisition failed to give them ownership of the patent that they
paid for? How do you explain to the client that state law is now irrelevant
when the Federal Circuit identifies patents in the transaction and insists on
the application of the Federal Circuit’s own law, displacing state law?
Unfortunately, the above scenarios and others just as surprising are not
the imaginary work of an erudite academic. They are the results of the
Federal Circuit’s extensive overreach into commercial law, including state
contract law, secured transaction law, fraudulent conveyance law, and trust
law. This Article is part of a broader inquiry into the Federal Circuit’s
patent exception approach; it is a follow up on a recent article on Patent
Prudential Standing.3 In reviewing the Federal Circuit cases on patent
prudential standing, this Article observes that while the court has
admirably commandeered its stewardship of patent law—Congress first
bestowed the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals in
19824—the court has extended its reach—unabashedly and without
welcome or congressional approval—into state-law areas, disturbing the
balance carefully struck under federalism. Often, in the name of patent
stewardship, the court’s foray into established state law areas yields
unexpected and unjustifiable results.
This Article will focus on a number of commercial law cases where the
Federal Circuit has overreached its patent jurisdiction. This Article argues
that, paradoxically, to steady its stewardship of patent law, the court should
not invoke patent law to rationalize its decisions concerning state
commercial law that dramatically alters established state law.
Encroachment on state law creates uncertainty and destabilizes federalism,
therefore the Federal Circuit must restrain itself, particularly as it has no
authority to inject itself into state law making.5 As the U.S. Supreme Court
has long instructed, federal courts must not exercise judicial preemption of
state law absent explicit federal law or policies justifying the exclusion of
state law.6 It is time for the Federal Circuit to retract its extensive reach
3. See generally Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Patent Prudential Standing, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV.
17 (2013) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s patent prudential standing rulings and arguing, inter
alia, that the Federal Circuit’s patent prudential doctrine is unnecessary and should be abrogated).
4. Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 802 F.2d 532, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Jason Rantanen
& Lee Petherbridge, Disuniformity, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2007, 2008–09 (2014) (discussing the creation
of the Federal Circuit by Congress and its “exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals”).
5. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases
Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1238 n.66 (2004) (noting that federal
courts are increasingly deciding questions of state law “based on federal rather than state court
precedent” and arguing that problems of legal certainty due to federal judicial usurpation have
returned). Federalism is the cornerstone of the U.S. governance structure where dual or divided
sovereignty operates to “preserve individual freedom, regional autonomy, political experimentation,
and the representational advantages of republicanism.” Anthony Kammer, Privatizing the
Safeguards of Federalism, 29 J.L. & POL. 69, 69 (2013) (observing that the Constitution reflects
federalism “principles in its design and, as it is currently interpreted, contains a number of
mechanisms—both structural conflicts and judicially enforced checks—to ensure that power
remains dispersed among state and federal governments with separate and competing jurisdictions”
(footnotes omitted)).
6. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994).
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into areas exclusively controlled by state law.7
Part I of this Article provides a comprehensive analysis of the Federal
Circuit’s overreach in state contract law, particularly in the area concerning
sale and purchase of property assets. There are three Sections in this Part of
the Article. The first Section presents the established contract law and best
practices in corporate assets transactions. The second Section focuses on a
Federal Circuit decision against the backdrop of established contract law
and best practices. The last Section offers a critique of the Federal Circuit’s
decision and judicial preemption of state commercial law, and portrays
potential consequences of the court’s unfettered reach under the disguise of
patent law.
Organized similarly, Part II focuses on the Federal Circuit’s overreach
in state secured transactions law and fraudulent conveyance law. This Part
(1) examines the established secured transactions law and practices in
commercial financing; (2) analyzes the Federal Circuit’s case on the
acceptance of security interest in a patent; and (3) discusses the chilling
message emanating from the Federal Circuit’s new law on secured
transactions and fraudulent conveyance.
Likewise, Part III identifies and discusses the Federal Circuit’s
overreach in state trust law, particularly in cases concerning liquidating a
trust formed under a bankruptcy confirmation or liquidation plan. This Part
explains how and why a liquidating trust is created in bankruptcy. The Part
also examines the relationship between the trust and its beneficiary and
how the relationship is in fact for the benefit of the beneficiary. With this
background, the Part dissects the Federal Circuit’s case in this area and
critiques its new trust law.
In Part IV, this Article turns to federalism principles to offer its critique
of the Federal Circuit’s overreach in commercial law. This Article
concludes that destabilization of federalism must promptly end in order to
foster the richness of existing state law and preserve the vision of
governance as dictated by and in the Constitution.
I. SALE AND PURCHASE OF ASSETS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S
CONTRACT LAW
This Part analyzes the Federal Circuit’s overreach in state contract law.
It starts by presenting the state of established contract law and then
presents a contrary Federal Circuit decision. It concludes by critiquing this
decision and outlining the negative consequences that ensue from it.
A. The Law of Sale and Purchase of Assets
In the competitive marketplace, companies acquire other target
7. See id. at 87–88; Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966); Wheeldin
v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
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companies for strategic reasons.8 There are two common ways a company
acquires a target: (1) the company may wish to conduct a stock acquisition
of the target, or (2) the company may wish to purchase only the assets from
the target.9 A stock acquisition means the company will assume the target’s
liability,10 whereas an asset purchase may permit the company to cherrypick the desirable assets and therefore avoid liability.11
Although the nonliability rule in asset purchases seems attractive,12
conducting an asset purchase is frequently time-consuming because teams
of business and legal advisors often must engage in extensive due diligence
prior to the closing of the deal.13 Mistakes are sometimes made in
identifying and transferring all the assets from the seller to the acquirer in
the transaction. Parties often include provisions in the various sale and
8. For a report on technology companies engaged in acquisition activities in 2012, see 2012
Tech M&A Activity Report – Private Company Acquisitions, CB INSIGHTS (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://www.cbinsights.com/blog/acquisitions/tech-mergers-acquisitions-deals-2012-report
(indicating that 2277 private technology companies were acquired globally in 2012 and the acquirers
paid $46.9 billion for the targets); see also Samuel Wagreich, Private Tech Company Acquisitions
Are up: Report, INC., http://www.inc.com/samuel-wagreich/private-tech-company-acquisitions-areup-report.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2013).
9. Another form of acquisition is a merger. See Wilson Chu, Negotiated Acquisitions of
Company Shares and Assets in the United States—Pitfalls and How to Avoid Them, 13 U.S.-MEX.
L.J. 55, 57 (2005) (“[A]cquisition agreements take one of three basic forms: stock deals, asset deals,
and merger agreements.”).
10. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 7.2, at 703 (2d ed. 2010); see Sharon L.
Cloud, Note, Purchase of Assets and Successor Liability: A Necessarily Arbitrary Limit, 11 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 791, 794 (1986) (discussing stock acquisition and liability).
11. GEVURTZ, supra note 10, § 7.2, at 703–04 (“Unlike the sale of assets transaction, the
buyer cannot pick and choose which liabilities it will assume and thus eschew the assumption of
unknown claims.”). There are limits to avoiding liability in an assets purchase. For example,
successor liability may hold the corporate successor liable for the predecessor’s defective products.
See Cloud, supra note 10, at 796–800 (identifying four different exceptions to the nonliability rule
in asset purchases).
12. See Cloud, supra note 10, at 794 (discussing the general rule of nonliability in asset
purchase deals).
13. See W. Ashley Hess, Recent Developments and Trends in Middle-Market M&A Due
Diligence Practices, ASPATORE (Apr. 2013), 2013 WL 2137397, at *2. Due diligence review is
important to the acquisition process:
The due diligence review and findings affect the way the parties negotiate and
draft the transaction agreement—a fact that may seem obvious, but is not always
fully appreciated. In some instances, the due diligence review uncovers dealbreakers or “show-stoppers,” and the parties decide not to complete the
transaction. In deals that move forward, the findings from due diligence help the
parties assess the risks of the transaction and allocate responsibility for those risks
in the transaction agreements. In this way, the due diligence review plays a role in
shaping the representations and warranties, covenants, closing conditions, and
other provisions in the transaction agreements. In addition to disclosure schedule
content, issues identified in due diligence may give rise to carve-outs or
exceptions to certain deal provisions.
Id.
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purchase agreements to address, in the post-closing phase, the discovery of
inadvertent mistakes made during the due diligence investigation phase.14
A closer look at common practices in asset purchases reveals that in a
typical asset purchase, the seller and acquirer generally enter into a master
asset purchase agreement (APA) and several ancillary documents.15 The
APA sets forth the terms of the transaction and provisions for the assets to
be transferred. For example, in a technology assets purchase, the APA
typically includes intellectual property (IP) provisions for the general scope
of the purchased IP assets, rights and liabilities, and covenants “governing
the parties’ conduct relating to the purchased IP . . . assets after signing”
relevant contractual agreements and closing the transaction.16 The APA’s
IP provisions also typically reference ancillary documents such as IP
assignment and license agreements, which contain much greater details
that the parties will execute at the closing time of the deal.17
Parties to a sale and purchase of assets often anticipate potential
problems that may arise in the future after the transaction occurs.
Therefore, they routinely draft the IP assignment to “typically include[] a
‘further assurances’ clause that obligates the seller to work with the buyer”
to ensure that the buyer actually obtains all the assets that the seller has
sold to the buyer.18 Lawyers for the contracting parties recognize that there
are post-closing actions that must be taken in order “to document the
transfer of the purchased IP assets in connection with the transaction.”19
This means the lawyers will file assignment documents with the
appropriate IP registries, whether in the United States or abroad, to update
the ownership of the IP assets purchased pursuant to the APA.20
The parties also generally contemplate when the closing day will
actually be for the transaction and draft the APA with the “effective time”
to be the closing date,21 an earlier date, or a date after the closing date.22
The effective time is binding on the parties, ensuring that the asset transfer
14. See Daniel Glazer, Intellectual Property: Asset Purchases, 102 TRADEMARK REP. 1314,
1345–46 (2012) (explaining various post-closing issues).
15. For sample APAs, see Asset Purchase Agreement, ONECLE, http://contracts.onecle.com/
type/19.shtml (last visited Dec. 12, 2014).
16. Glazer, supra note 14, at 1333.
17. Id. at 1343–45.
18. Id. at 1345.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1345–46.
21. See, e.g., Severstal U.S. Holdings, LLC v. RG Steel, LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d 430, 433
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that “Effective Time” is the closing date); Marathon Projects Ltd. v.
Creative Designs Int’l., Ltd., No. 10 CV 2396(RPP), 2011 WL 1002424, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16,
2011) (stating that in the APA the “Effective Time is defined as 11:59 p.m. on the Closing Date”
(internal quotations omitted)); Marzoll v. Marine Harvest US, Inc., No. 08-261-B-S, 2009 WL
4456321, at *29 (D. Me. Nov. 29, 2009) (noting that the “Effective Time” is the closing date).
22. See VisionChina Media Inc. v. S’holder Representative Servs., LLC, 967 N.Y.S.2d 338,
340–41 (App. Div. 2013) (noting that the closing date was two months before the “Effective Date”).
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contractually occurs between the parties.23 The effective time is also used
to calculate and ascertain whether a claim that the buyer may have against
the seller after the assets sale transaction has occurred is still within the
zone of protection.24
To encourage corporate commercial transactions such as asset transfers,
courts routinely treat these transactions simply as contractual transfers of
property governed by state law.25 Contract law of the jurisdiction selected
by the parties to the asset transfer agreement governs claims and disputes
arising from the contract.26 Courts recognize that the primary rule of

23. For example, in Old T.B.R., Inc. v. Billing Res., LLC (In re Old T.B.R., Inc.), Ch. 11 Case
No. 07-52890-ASW, Adv. No. 09-5074, 2011 WL 5402506 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2011), the
APA provided:
On the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in this Agreement, at the
Closing (but effective as of the Effective Time) Seller [Debtor] shall sell, convey,
assign, transfer and deliver to Purchaser [New TBR], and Purchaser shall
purchase, acquire and accept from Seller, free and clear of all liens, claims and
encumbrances (except for the Assumed Liabilities), all of Seller’s right, title and
interest in and to all of the assets, properties and business of every kind and
description, wherever located, real, personal or mixed, tangible or intangible,
owned or held by Seller as the same existed immediately prior to the Closing other
than the Excluded Assets . . . .
Id. at *12 (alterations in original).
24. For example, in VisionChina Media Inc., the buyer brought action against the seller,
alleging that the buyer’s claims against the seller were within the one-year period from the effective
time as negotiated by the parties to the APA. 967 N.Y.S.2d at 343. The court determined that
“[a]lthough the buyers offer several reasons why the contractual one-year limitation period should
be ignored . . . , none are persuasive.” Id.
25. Sales of assets or acquisitions are today’s modern corporate contracts. See GRT, Inc. v.
Marathon GTF Tech., Ltd., No. 5571-CS, 2011 WL 2682898, at *12 & n.65 (Del. Ch. July 11,
2011) (emphasizing the contractual nature of the transaction); In re Fitch, 174 B.R. 96, 101 (Bankr.
S.D. Ill. 1994) (“Determination of the significance of the remaining obligations [of a contract] is
made by looking to state law, as state law controls with regard to property rights in assets of a
debtor’s estate.” (citing Mitchell v. Streets (In re Streets & Beard P’ship), 882 F.2d 233, 235 (7th
Cir. 1989))).
26. See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1972) (according presumptive
validity to choice-of-law provisions in the contract); Postlewaite v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 411 F.3d 63,
67 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying New York law where “[t]he parties do not dispute that New York law
applies” pursuant to the contract); Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629
F.2d 786, 793 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York law where the contract at issue contained a New
York choice-of-law provision).
In cases where the contract fails to include a choice-of-law provision, courts still look to state
contract law to determine the meaning of a patent assignment contract. See Euclid Chem. Co. v.
Vector Corrosion Techs., Inc., No. 1:05CV080, 2007 WL 4460628, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 14,
2007) (applying Ohio law to determine the meaning of a patent assignment contract), vacated, 561
F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (providing still that “[c]onstruction of patent assignment contracts
is a matter of state contract law” (quoting Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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contract law is that when the parties express their intent in clear terms,27
courts “will not resort to construction.”28 For instance, if the parties have
intended and stated in the contract that the transaction will be effective “as
of” an earlier date, courts would hold that the contract is retroactive to the
earlier date.29
Indeed, courts look at the plain language of the contract and hold that
the transfer is deemed to occur at the effective time.30 VisionChina Media
Inc. v. Shareholder Representative Services, L.L.C. is an example of how the
court looks to effective time for the calculation of the critical period during
which buyers can assert claims against the sellers as negotiated by the

27. For example, “[u]nder New York law, a written contract is to be interpreted so as to give
effect to the intention of the parties as expressed in the unequivocal language they have employed.”
Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 206 F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Breed v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
385 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (N.Y. 1978)).
28. Bruhl v. Thul, 134 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Iowa 1965) (“The court will not resort to
construction where the intent of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language.”); 2
SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATY ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6:61, at 894 (4th
ed. 2007) (“[I]t seems clear that, where the parties themselves agree that a contract between them
should be given effect as of a specified date, absent the intervention of third-party rights, there is no
sound reason why that agreement should not be given effect.”); see, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Co. v.
Ring, 286 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ga. 1982) (“[T]he effective date of a contract is not the date of execution
where the contract expressly states that its terms are to take effect at an earlier date.”); Goldstein v.
Ipswich Hosiery Co., 122 S.E.2d 339, 345 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961) (“It is elemental that contracting
parties may agree to give retroactive effect, between themselves, to their contracts as they may see
fit.”); FH Partners, LLC v. Complete Home Concepts, Inc., 378 S.W.3d 387, 395 (Mo. Ct. App.
2012) (“The primary rule in interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the intent of the parties and
give effect to that intent.” (quoting Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Azia Contractors, Inc., 886 S.W.2d 640,
642 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)); Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 886 S.W.2d at 642 (“Where there is no ambiguity
in a contract, the intent of the parties is to be determined from the contract alone and the courts will
not resort to construction where the intent of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous
language.”); see also Massey v. Exxon Corp., 942 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Kentucky law
clearly allows parties to a contract to predate a contract and both parties will be bound by that
agreement.”).
29. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Tandem Prods., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(“When a written contract provides that it shall be effective ‘as of’ an earlier date, it generally is
retroactive to the earlier date.”), aff’d, 526 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1975). Some courts go further: “The
law does not support the blanket conclusion that a retroactive effective date in a contract is only
enforceable when the evidence demonstrates that the parties had agreed to the material terms of
their contract as of the retroactive date.” FH Partners, 378 S.W.3d at 396. Courts are willing to
consider:
where a contract is ambiguous with respect to its effective date, the absence of an
explanation for a retroactive effective date, and evidence that the parties had not
agreed to the material terms of their contract as of the purported retroactive
effective date, are relevant considerations in resolving the ambiguity.
Id.
30. See VisionChina Media Inc. v. S’holder Representative Servs., LLC, 967 N.Y.S.2d 338,
340–41 (App. Div. 2013).
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parties.31 In that case, the buyers purchased assets from the sellers pursuant
to a merger agreement, which contained a number of representations and
warranties.32 The contractual provisions provided that the buyers could
bring claims against the sellers upon finding any of the representations or
warranties to be untrue or inaccurate within the one year period before the
effective time.33 The buyers failed to timely assert claims against the sellers
during the allotted period, as the court found:
Thus, the buyers negotiated terms that would have allowed
them to discover the alleged fraud and to cancel the
agreement but they then failed to take advantage of these
terms. Moreover, the documentary evidence which allegedly
reveals the fraud, that is, the E & Y report, was [i]ndisputably
in the buyers’ possession within the one-year contractually
negotiated period for making a claim against the sellers, but
the buyers chose not to make a notice of claim.34
The VisionChina Media court looked to state contract law to resolve the
dispute relating to assets transferred pursuant to the agreement. Likewise,
if a sale and purchase transaction includes the transfer of IP assets, courts
recognize that “[b]ecause patents have the attributes of personal property,
the transfer of patents and property rights . . . in patents are governed by
state law.”35 Thus, transfer and ownership of patents are matters governed
by state contract law.36 Indeed, courts must apply state law when
determining the “contractual obligations and transfers of property rights,

31. See id. at 344.
32. Id. at 340–41.
33. Id. at 341, 343.
34. Id. at 344.
35. St. John’s Univ., N.Y. v. Bolton, 757 F. Supp. 2d 144, 190 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citation
omitted) (citing Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d
832, 841 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
36. See Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(“It may seem strange at first blush that the question of whether a patent is valid and infringed
ordinarily is one for federal courts, while the question of who owns the patent rights and on what
terms typically is a question exclusively for state courts. Yet that long has been the law.”); see also
Sky Techs. LLC v. SAP AG, 576 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2343
(2010).
Similarly, when federal bankruptcy law intersects with contract law, courts look to state law to
govern contractual issues. See, e.g., River Prod., Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727,
738 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Even in bankruptcy proceedings, courts of appeals look to state law to decide
contract issues.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has “long recognized that the basic federal rule in
bankruptcy is that the state law governs the substance of claims, Congress having generally left the
determination of property rights in the assets of bankrupt’s estate to state law.” Travelers Cas. &
Surety Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 451 (2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Therefore, “when the Bankruptcy Code uses the word ‘claim’ . . . it is usually referring to
a right to payment recognized under state law.” Id.
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including those relating to patents.”37 For example, according to state
contract law, in a case where the patentee has already assigned its
invention to the assignee within the scope of the assignment, the former
patentee cannot later claim ownership of the transferred invention that has
subsequently been granted a patent.38 Likewise, state law controls the
outcome in a case involving foreclosure sale of patents by a secured
creditor at an auction and change of title of ownership with respect to the
purchased patents.39 Similarly, “actions . . . vindicat[ing] property rights in
patents are subject to state statutes of limitations, and state law doctrines
[that] determin[e] when a limitations period may be tolled.”40
B. Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC
Contrary to established state contract law governing sales and purchases
of assets, the Federal Circuit has developed its own approach. The Federal
Circuit has recently ignored the contracting parties’ choice-of-law
provision in the contract, creating its own contract law in disregard of longstanding choice-of-law rules, which accord significant weight to a choiceof-law provision in a contract.41 Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC42
is a glaring example of the Federal Circuit’s expansive overreach into state
contract law for commercial sale and purchase transactions involving
patent property under the disguise of exclusive jurisdiction over patents.
Abraxis centered on a commercial transaction involving the sale and
purchase of assets.43 Here, the transaction was between two pharmaceutical
37. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
38. See Reid v. Gen. Motors Corp., 489 F. Supp. 2d 614, 617, 621 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (“[The
patent at issue] is within the scope of the IP Assignment. Such an assignment automatically
transfers title ‘by operation of law’ once an invention comes into being. Plaintiffs are without title
and, therefore, without standing to bring the instant suit, and Defendants’ motions to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted” (citation omitted)).
39. See Sky Techs. LLC, 576 F.3d at 1376–79 (holding that the chain of title in the purchased
patents was not broken from the defaulted debtor to the secured creditor and then to the subsequent
purchaser of the foreclosed patents).
40. See St. John’s Univ., 757 F. Supp. at 191 (“Because Defendants invoke constructive
notice of the Liquisolid Patents to defeat Plaintiff’s claim to equitable tolling of New York statutes
of limitations and trigger the fraud discovery accrual rule on the date of the Liquisolid Patents’
issuance, the issue is controlled by New York State law, and the court must determine whether a
New York court would impute knowledge of the Liquisolid Patents’ existence to Plaintiff.”).
41. See, e.g., Advani Enters., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 140 F.3d 157, 162–63 (2d Cir.
1998) (noting that federal choice-of-law rules accord considerable weight to a choice-of-law
provision in a contract); see also KLATMW, INC. v. Elec. Sys. Prot., Inc., No. 09-CVS-16393,
2011 WL 1675633, at *1–2, *15 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 2, 2011) (noting that “[t]he case arises from
the sale of assets of an ongoing business pursuant to an asset purchase agreement containing certain
warranties, incorporating a choice of law,” and holding that the remaining claims should be
resolved pursuant to New York law because the “consensual choice of law clause in the purchase
contract dictates the application of New York law to the contract claims”).
42. 625 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 115 (2011).
43. Id. at 1361.
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companies, seller AstraZeneca (AZ) and buyer Abraxis.44 According to the
press release about the important sale, the transaction included eight
anesthetic and analgesic drug products and their patents,45 as part of a
larger $350 million assets sale.46
The transaction unfolded in a typical fashion that commercial lawyers
are intimately familiar with.47 The parties entered into an APA dated April
26, 2006, and selected New York law to govern the contract.48 Under the
APA, AZ “shall, or shall cause one or more of its Affiliates to, Transfer to
the Purchaser . . . all of the right, title and interests of the Seller and its
Affiliates in and to” the transferred patent assets.49 Among various
ancillary documents executed as part of the assets’ acquisition by Abraxis,
on June 28, 2006, the parties signed an IP Assignment Agreement, which
referred back to the APA and stated that the “provisions of this instrument
are subject to the terms and conditions of the Purchase Agreement.”50 The
IP Assignment Agreement also included a “Further Assurances” clause
affirming that the seller, AZ, will “do, execute, acknowledge and deliver,
or will cause to be done, executed, acknowledged and delivered, any and
all further acts, conveyances, transfers, assignments, and assurances as
necessary to grant, sell, convey, assign, transfer, set over to or vest in
Buyer any of the Transferred Intellectual Property.”51
The IP Assignment Agreement listed the transferred patents, including
patent numbers 4,870,086 (‘086), 5,670,524 (‘524), and 5,834,489 (‘489),
in Schedule A.52 The transaction, however, was incomplete as AZ
subsequently discovered that some of its affiliates had failed to formally
assign their patents, including patents ‘086, ‘524, and ‘489 that were part
of the assets transferred to Abraxis.53 To correct their mistakes, these
affiliates (transferors) immediately transferred the pertinent patents to AZ
(transferee), and AZ then conveyed the patents to Abraxis (the original
buyer) in accordance with the “Further Assurances” clause by executing
44. Id.
45. AstraZeneca’s press release announced that it would receive $350 million from Abraxis
for the part of the deal involving anesthetics and analgesic products including, Xylocaine,
Polocaine, Naropin, Nesacaine, Sensorcaine, Astramorph, Emla Cream, and Diprivan. See Press
Release, AstraZeneca, AstraZeneca and Abraxis BioScience to Co-Promote Cancer Therapy
ABRAXANE; Abraxis Bioscience to Acquire AstraZeneca’s U.S. Anaesthetic and Analgesic
Product Portfolio (Apr. 27, 2006), http://www.astrazeneca.com/Media/Press-releases/Article/
20060427--AstraZeneca-and-Abraxis-BioScience-to-copromote-canc.
46. See id.; Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, No. 07-1251, 2009 WL 904043, at *1
(D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2009), rev’d, vacated, and remanded, 625 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
47. See Glazer, supra note 14, at 1333, 1343–46 (describing asset purchase transactions and
necessary documents).
48. See Abraxis Bioscience, 625 F.3d at 1361; id. at 1368 (Newman, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 1368–69 (Newman, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 1369.
51. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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additional assignment documents in March 2007.54 The assignment
documents each stated that:
[T]his instrument is being executed by the parties to enable
the Transferee to further convey to Buyer that portion of the
Transferred Assets included in the Asset Purchase Agreement,
dated as of April 26, 2006 . . . pursuant to which Transferee
agreed to sell to Buyer and Buyer agreed to purchase from
Transferee the Transferred Assets, all as more particularly set
out in the Purchase Agreement, with consummation of the
transactions . . . deemed to occur at the Effective Time on the
Closing Date.55
Subsequently, the original seller, AZ, and buyer Abraxis confirmed with
each other that Abraxis now had owned all “right, title, and interest” to the
patents “since no later than June 28, 2006.”56 As noted above, the original
APA was executed as part of the asset acquisition on April 26, 2006.57
The above transaction was a typical transfer of property by contract
within the provenance of state law. Since the contracting parties to the
transaction selected New York law to govern the contract, courts should
have applied New York law.58 The transferred patents at issue were
subsequently the subject of patent infringement litigation brought by
Abraxis against a third party, Navinta, and within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Federal Circuit.59 Navinta challenged Abraxis for lack of standing in
bringing the infringement case in the district court.60 Applying New York
contract law on retroactivity, the district court found that Abraxis was the
owner of all the transferred assets, including the patents identified in
Schedule A that were inadvertently omitted as of the Closing Date, June
28, 2006.61 When Navinta appealed, instead of applying New York state
contract law on the transfer of patents pursuant to the APA, as the district
court had correctly done,62 the Federal Circuit panel majority had a
54. Id. at 1369–70.
55. Id. (second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Abraxis brought its patent infringement litigation against Navinta on March 15, 2007,
after Abraxis acquired the assets for $350 million from AZ and affiliates in the April 26, 2006
transaction with the closing date of June 28, 2006. See Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC,
No. 07-1251, 2009 WL 904043, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2009), rev’d, vacated, and remanded, 625
F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
60. Id. (noting the defendant’s lack of standing argument).
61. See Abraxis Bioscience, 2009 WL 904043, at *4. This is consistent with the district court
finding that “[g]iven this retroactive effect, the IP Agreement would then operate to transfer title
from AZ[] to Abraxis as of that date as well” for the omitted patents that were later assigned. Id.
62. See Abraxis Bioscience, 625 F.3d at 1360; id. at 1368 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The
court thus erases the trial, nullifies the judgment, cancels the appeal, and sends the case back so that
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different idea. The panel majority asserted that because the transfer of
property in this case involved patents, and because whether there was an
assignment of patents would affect the buyer Abraxis’s standing to bring
an infringement suit against others, the case was “a matter of federal law”
and therefore had to be “resolved by Federal Circuit law.”63 Accordingly,
the panel majority applied a string of Federal Circuit decisions on patent
assignments and promises to assign.64 These decisions have nothing to do
with commercial sales or corporate asset transfers that included patent
assets under state contract law.65
The panel majority completely ignored New York law on contracts for
transfers of property assets, as its opinion neither discussed nor cited to any
New York state court decision on the transfer of assets contract.66 Applying
Federal Circuit law on patent assignment of future inventions, the panel
majority treated the asset sale and purchase merely as one of many
assignments of future invention cases and ruled that under the patent
assignment documents, Abraxis did not own the patents until November
12, 2007.67 Therefore, the panel majority concluded that Abraxis lacked
standing to bring the patent infringement suit against Navinta in the
complaint filed on March 15, 2007.68
If the panel majority had adhered to federalism principles 69 and applied
New York contract law on transfers of property assets, as it should have
done, the outcome would have been different. Under New York contract
law, a written contract with a provision of an effective date before or after
the date the parties sign the contract is valid.70 This means if the parties
select a date to be the effective date for the property conveyance, that date
will govern the transaction and be the date the buyer becomes the owner of

the parties and the district court and this court can do it all again. However, the court has not shown
reversible error in the district court’s ruling on the question of standing, a ruling based on state
contract and commercial transaction law.” (emphasis added)).
63. Id. at 1364 (majority opinion) (citing DDB Techs., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P.,
517 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
64. Id. at 1364–65.
65. Id. (citing Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. 583
F.3d 832, 841 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011)); DDB Techs., 517 F.3d at 1290;
IPVenture, Inc. v. ProStar Computer, Inc., 503 F.3d 1324, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Schreiber
Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice Cheese, Inc., 402 F.3d 1198, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Speedplay, Inc. v.
Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d
1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
66. See Abraxis Bioscience, 625 F.3d at 1359 (relying strictly on federal precedent to analyze
standing).
67. Id. at 1365–66.
68. Id. at 1365–66, 1368.
69. See infra Part IV.
70. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Tandem Prods., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff’d, 526 F.2d 593, 600 (2d Cir. 1975).
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the transferred assets.71 Likewise, if the parties to a sale of property execute
a contract with a particular closing date as the effective date, the closing
date will be the date on which the property is conveyed from the seller to
the buyer.72
Under the parties’ reasonable expectations that state contract law would
be applied, the sellers and buyers elected to convey the patent property,
among other transferred assets, from AZ to Abraxis for $350 million on the
closing date. Pursuant to the APA, the closing date was June 28, 2006,73
and the instrument—the IP Assignment Agreement included as part of the
acquisition transaction—was binding on the parties.74 Accordingly, on
June 28, 2006, Abraxis became the (purported, according to the majority)
new owner of the transferred assets, including the patents.75 Both AZ and
Abraxis, like many other sophisticated parties in complex commercial sale
transactions, understood that inadvertent mistakes are sometimes made and
that parties to the transaction generally include provisions like “further
assurances” to correct these mistakes in order to effectuate the parties’
intent in the original contract.76
In this case, the IP Assignment Agreement contained the “Further
Assurances” provision under which the seller contractually had to deliver
to the buyer all the properties that the seller had already sold to the buyer
pursuant to the Master Purchase Agreement.77 When the mistake—that not
all the patents had been conveyed as of the Closing Date—was discovered,
the parties corrected the mistake pursuant to the “Further Assurances”
provision and the buyer was deemed to own the transferred patents as of
the Closing Date, June 28, 2006.78
The “Further Assurances” provision allowed for the patent conveyance
to be retroactive.79 This was consistent with New York law,80 which allows
written contracts to be retroactive if the contract so provides in its relevant
71. See Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U.S. 167, 175–76 (1923)
(applying New York law, the court held that “[i]t was competent for the parties to agree that the
effective date of the policy should be one prior to its actual execution or issue; and this, in our
opinion, is what they did” and that “[p]lainly[,] their agreement was effective”).
72. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, 368 F. Supp. at 1270.
73. See Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, No. 07-1251, 2009 WL 904043, at *1
(D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2009), rev’d, vacated, and remanded, 625 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
74. See Abraxis Bioscience, 625 F.3d at 1370 (Newman, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1361 (majority opinion).
76. See id. at 1369 (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting that “[i]t is not unusual [for parties] to
transfer a complex set of related assets” through a master agreement and ancillary agreements, such
as a “Further Assurances” clause).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1369–70.
79. See id. at 1370.
80. New York law of contracts allows written contracts to be retroactive. Viacom Int’l Inc. v.
Tandem Prods., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). If the contract provides that it will
become effective “as of” an earlier date, then the contract is “retroactive to the earlier date.” Id.
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provisions.81 Furthermore, New York law of contracts permits retroactivity
to correct unintended omission or mistake in an earlier agreement.82
The panel majority, however, ignored New York law of contracts when
it noted the transaction involved patent assignments, immediately
extending its patent reach. With its exclusive jurisdiction to hear patent
appeal cases,83 the panel majority committed a grave error when it
zealously applied Federal Circuit law to a sale contract and disregarded the
parties’ choice of law contract provision. Sales of patents are simply sales
of property, and such property conveyances are governed by state contract
law.84 The commercial sale of existing patents in the present case must be
governed by New York law of contracts, absent any preemption or federal
interest or policy.85 The panel majority extended its patent jurisdiction too
far when it completely abandoned state law in interpreting the sale
contract.86
By ignoring the long-standing rule that construction of a patent
assignment agreement is a matter of state law, the Federal Circuit dictated
a new rule that if a commercial sale involved patents, the transaction
automatically falls within the purview of the Federal Circuit and that the
Federal Circuit Court would apply its own law to construe the patent
81. See id. Under New York law, ‘“[t]he fundamental, neutral precept of contract
interpretation is that agreements are construed in accord with the parties’ intent.”’ Anita Babikian,
Inc. v. TMA Realty, LLC, 912 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Greenfield v. Philles
Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
82. See Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc. (In re Local
Union 1567), 478 N.Y.S.2d 937, 938 (App. Div. 1984) (permitting retroactive application of
arbitration provision despite “the fact that the grievances arose while there was no agreement to
arbitrate”); Buffalo Police Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Buffalo, 453 N.Y.S.2d 314, 317 (Sup. Ct.
1982) (permitting retroactivity of a collective bargaining agreement to cover the period between the
new contract execution date and the expiration of the old contract); Matthews v. Jeremiah Burns,
Inc., 129 N.Y.S.2d 841, 847 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (permitting the amended agreement to be retroactive to
the date of the original amendment).
83. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807 (1988).
84. See Euclid Chem. Co. v. Vector Corrosion Techs., Inc., 561 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“Construction of patent assignment agreements is a matter of state contract law.” (quoting
Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
85. The Federal Circuit was divided on this point. See Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta
LLC, 672 F.3d 1239, 1240–41 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (per curiam) (arguing that,
“[n]otwithstanding New York [contract] law,” the parties could not “retroactively override federal
law to revive failed agreements”). But see id. at 1241 (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (arguing that
preempting state contract law in the instant case neglects clear Supreme Court precedent “restricting
preemption of state law” and which precedent “uniformly proscribed the judicial creation of a
special federal rule absent a significant conflict between state law and some federal policy or
interest” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
86. The panel majority’s approach is contrary to other Federal Circuit decisions on contract
interpretation. See generally Tri-Star Elecs. Int’l, Inc. v. Preci-Dip Durtal SA, 619 F.3d 1364, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“An assignment of a patent is interpreted in accordance with statutory and
common law of contract . . . .”).
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assignment agreement.87 Moreover, the Federal Circuit law, on which the
panel majority erroneously relied, concerned promises to assign future
inventions in an employment context, not massive corporate sale of assets
involving existing patents.88 By justifying its decision that the contract was
a matter of federal law under Federal Circuit precedents, the panel majority
has created a patent exception to the general rule of contract
interpretation.89 The panel majority should have known that the patentexception approach has already been squarely rejected by the U.S. Supreme
Court in recent years.90
The panel majority’s decision has caused uncertainty in future
commercial contracts involving conveyance of patents. Parties to a sale
contract with a choice-of-law provision expect predictability. They expect
courts to apply state law and the contract law of the jurisdiction selected.
Though Abraxis Bioscience concerned a commercial sale of existing
patents, the panel majority arbitrarily ignored the actual commercial
transaction, state contract law, and the New York choice-of-law provision.
Worse, while the parties to the contract did not dispute that the transferred
assets in a complex transaction of $350 million did include the pertinent
patents on the Closing Date of June 28, 2006,91 the panel majority injected
its judicial preemption to support its conclusion that the transfer occurred
in November 2007.92 The panel majority’s decision was contrary to the
terms that the parties agreed to in the commercial contract.93
The Federal Circuit’s assault on commercial law did not end there.
Abraxis subsequently petitioned the Federal Circuit for a hearing en banc,
and the Federal Circuit, in a per curiam decision, denied the en banc
87. The panel majority erroneously relied on Federal Circuit cases on promises to assign
inventions in future time, as explained in the dissenting opinion. See Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v.
Navinta LLC, 625 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 115 (2011).
88. See id. at 1364–65 (majority opinion) (“Because the APA is a promise by AZ[] to assign
the relevant patents to Abraxis when AZ[] obtains legal title, under our ‘promise to assign’ cases, a
subsequent written agreement is necessary to consummate the assignment.”).
89. See id. at 1364 (“[T]he question of whether a patent assignment clause creates an
automatic assignment or merely an obligation to assign is intimately bound up with the question of
standing in patent cases. We have accordingly treated it as a matter of federal law.”).
90. See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 122, 136 (2007) (rejecting
Federal Circuit precedent ruling that “a patent licensee in good standing cannot establish an Article
III case or controversy with regard to validity, enforceability, or scope of the patent because the
license agreement ‘obliterate[s] any reasonable apprehension’ that the licensee will be sued for
infringement” (alterations in original) (quoting Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–94 (2006) (rejecting the
Federal Circuit’s application of a general Patent Act exception to a “long tradition of equity
practice” and holding that the well-established principles of equity “apply with equal force to
disputes arising under the Patent Act” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
91. See Abraxis Bioscience, 625 F.3d at 1368 (Newman, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 1372.
93. See id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3

144

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

petition, with three judges penning a concurrence over the dissent of two
other judges.94 Again, at this juncture, as seen in the concurrence, the
Federal Circuit ignored the acquisition of the patent assets by Abraxis as
part of the complex asset sale and purchase transaction.95 The Federal
Circuit summarily dismissed the case as a “simple” matter because the
court believed that Abraxis did not own the patents when it filed the patent
infringement action.96 The concurrence emphasized that the case was
correctly decided under the Federal Circuit’s precedents on patents.97
C. The Federal Circuit’s New Contract Law for Patents
A cursory glance at Abraxis Bioscience may not mean much to patent
scholars and the patent bar, as the case can be viewed simply as a matter of
lack of standing to bring an infringement suit under § 261 of the Patent Act
due to the plaintiff’s not having ownership of the patents on the filing date.
The decision, however, is anything but simple. By hiding behind patent
law, the Federal Circuit has created its own federal common law of
contracts to govern commercial sales of assets where the assets happen to
include patents.98 The Federal Circuit failed to explain why it requires
parties to asset transfers involving patents to apply Federal Circuit contract
law in complete disregard of state contract law provisions negotiated and
chosen by both the seller and acquirer of the assets.99
Specifically, the Federal Circuit, in both the panel majority opinion and
the subsequent three-judge concurrence opinion rejecting the petition for
an en banc hearing, did not identify any conflict between federal law or
policy and state contract law to justify the imposition of Federal Circuit
created contract law.100 The Federal Circuit provided no justification for
why it had expressly displaced New York contract law. The court also
offered no explanation for why New York contract law must not be applied
to the master APA for the $350 million sale of assets, including the
existing patents owned by the seller and its affiliates at the time of sale,
and the ancillary IP Assignment Agreement executed by the contracting
parties. Under New York contract law, the agreements plainly operated to
vest the title in the patents and other assets at the “Effective Time,” and the
contracting parties to the massive sale of corporate assets did not dispute
the transaction.101 In fact, the contracting seller even provided further “belt94. See Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 672 F.3d 1239, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per
curiam).
95. See id. at 1240 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1240–41.
98. Id. at 1241 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
99. See id.
100. See id. (noting that the panel majority did not identify a conflict between state law and
federal policy or interest).
101. See supra notes 79–82, 91–92 and accompanying text.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/3

18

Nguyen: In the Name of Patent Stewardship: The Federal Circuit's Overreac

2015]

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S OVERREACH IN COMMERCIAL LAW

145

and-suspenders confirmation” of what it had already conveyed under New
York law.102 The court’s complete disregard of state contract law on
transfer of property ownership is evidence of the Federal Circuit
overextending its patent jurisdiction.
Without identifying any conflict between federal and state law to
legitimize displacing New York contract law, the Federal Circuit looked to
its own precedents on promises to assign future inventions.103 The question
addressed in those cases centers on “whether a patent assignment clause
creates an automatic assignment or merely an obligation to assign.”104 The
Federal Circuit’s solution to the question is “intimately bound up with the
question of standing in patent cases,” and therefore it held that federal law
should displace state contract law.105
This decision was incorrect for a number of reasons. First, the
precedents have nothing to do with contracts to sell massive assets
inclusive of existing patents. Second, the precedents have nothing to do
with corporate sale transactions by contracting parties who have negotiated
for each of the contract provisions in exchange for large monetary value in
the acquisition of a target company through asset purchases. Third, the
precedents have nothing to do with the clear intent of the parties through
execution of a master sale agreement and ancillary agreements to vest title
in the acquirer on an effective date agreed upon by the parties. Finally, the
precedents have nothing to do with the body of state contract law
recognizing property that actually has been transferred retroactively on the
effective date.106
Erroneous wholesale application of Federal Circuit precedents to
Abraxis Bioscience has created a new body of Federal Circuit contract
law.107 Under this new law, contracting parties can no longer rely on state
contract law to govern the terms of the contracts. The contracting parties
cannot rely on their choice of law as the controlling law for their contract.
They also cannot rely on the typical contractual provisions in a sale and
asset purchase agreement. “Effective date” and “further asssurances”
provisions are now meaningless as contracting parties cannot rely on state
102. Abraxis Bioscience, 672 F.3d at 1247 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1364 (majority opinion).
104. Id. (quoting DDB Techs., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 517 F.3d 1284, 1290
(Fed. Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Id. (quoting DDB Techs., 517 F.3d at 1290) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also,
e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. 583 F.3d 832, 841
(Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011); IPVenture, Inc. v. ProStar Computer, Inc., 503 F.3d
1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1094 (2008); Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus.,
Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1580–81 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
106. See Abraxis Bioscience, 672 F.3d at 1241, 1243–46, 1247 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 1241 (“The panel majority’s creation of federal common law to govern assignments
of existing patents conflicts not only with our precedent, but with longstanding Supreme Court
precedent restricting judicial preemption of state law.”).
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law for vesting title retroactively.108
Moreover, the new Federal Circuit’s contract law has devastating
consequences for commercial law and practices. Complex acquisition of a
target company through asset sales will be discouraged because for any
patent that is not assigned through ancillary agreement by the sellers and its
affiliates on the date the parties execute the master APA, the acquirer will
have no recourse against a third party for subsequent infringement,
regardless of whether the seller has already sold and the acquirer has
already purchased all of the seller’s and its affiliates’ assets.109
A rigid, bright-line rule has been created in the Federal Circuit’s patent
vacuum to disrupt contracting parties’ expectation for certainty in their
corporate commercial transactions. Companies engaging in strategic
decisions to buy or sell corporate assets that include patents now face a
new burden and associated cost. What company would want to be in
Abraxis’ situation: Paying $350 million for assets from a seller and its
affiliates; paying professionals to assist in negotiating the deal; conducting
due diligence and drafting the contracts; subsequently bringing an
infringement litigation against a third party and battling the patent
infringement action on the merits for over three years, including a full trial
on infringement; and a judicial determination relating to the Hatch–
Waxman Act for a debilitating outcome after the district court’s judgment
was nullified by the new Federal Circuit contract law dictating that Abraxis
had no ownership of the patents and therefore lacked the standing to bring
the infringement suit in the first place?110
II. SECURITY INTEREST IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ASSETS AND FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
This Part focuses on the Federal Circuit’s overreach in state secured
transactions law and fraudulent conveyance law. It examines established
secured transactions law and practices in commercial financing and a
contrary Federal Circuit case. Finally, it discusses the impact of the case on
secured transactions.
A. The Law of Secured Transactions and Fraudulent Conveyances
Secured transactions are common commercial transactions that occur
daily.111 In a nutshell, when a party is in need of credit, it may attempt to
108. See id. at 1241–46.
109. See id. at 1241.
110. Cf. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM . & M ARY L.
REV. 1791, 1819 (2013) (“According to recent opinions by some Federal Circuit judges, the court
has improperly leveraged choice-of-law doctrine to expand the scope of federal common law and
restrict the scope of state contract law. This dispute . . . might be the next doctrinal battle within the
Federal Circuit’s federalism relationship.” (footnote omitted)).
111. See, e.g., Dollar General Seeks $3.15 Billion to Refinance Secured Debt, MONEYNEWS
(Apr. 8, 2013, 3:10 PM), http://www.moneynews.com/Companies/Dollar-General-refinance-KKR-
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obtain credit from a lender. Typically, the lender does not want to extend a
credit line or make a loan to the borrower without any security for the
repayment of the loan.112 This means the lender will demand that in
exchange for the loan, the borrower must grant a security interest in its
personal, not real, property assets to the lender.113 If the loan is secured, in
the event that the debtor is unable to meet the scheduled repayments, the
secured creditor can accelerate the debt114 and foreclose on the debtor’s
collateral property.115 Also, to obtain priority among other creditors of the
debtor, the lender wants to place other creditors on notice by perfecting its
security interest in the debtor’s collateral property through filing a
financing statement with the Secretary of State’s Office where the debtor is
deemed to be located.116
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC-9) governs secured
transactions, and all states have adopted UCC-9.117 Secured transactions
law recognizes that the debtor and the secured creditor often enter into an
agreement that covers future advances118 and after-acquired collateral

debt/2013/04/08/id/498393; Sterling Consolidated Secures $2.45 Million Senior Bank Debt,
REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/10/idUSnGNX4
TNZFK+1df+GNW20131010; JCPenney Announces Consummation of $2.25 Billion Term Loan
and Initial Settlement of Its Tender Offer and Consent Solicitation, JCPENNEY (May 22, 2013),
http://ir.jcpenney.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=70528&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1823443 (announcing that
JCPenney entered into a new five-year $2.25 billion senior secured term loan credit facility).
112. WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING SECURED TRANSACTIONS 2 (5th ed. 2012);
see Dana Cimilluca & Sam Schechner, Alcatel-Lucent Secures $2.1 Billion Debt Financing, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2012, 9:47 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732398
1504578177982789220970 (subscription required) (“The new loans will mostly be secured by the
Paris-based company’s U.S. assets . . . . [including] a portfolio of patents from the company’s
storied Bell Labs research arm and at least part of the company’s fast-growing data-networking
business.”).
113. See U.C.C. § 9-109 (2010) (addressing the scope of secured transactions).
114. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: SECURED
TRANSACTIONS § 25-3, at 887 (2000) (discussing the prevalence of acceleration as an option to
secured parties).
115. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-601(a) (permitting the secured party, upon the debtor’s default, to
“reduce a claim to judgment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce the claim”); id. § 9-607 (addressing
collections and enforcements by a secured party); Kathy Cabral & Teresa Wilton Harmon, Remedies
Outside the Box: Enforcing Security Interests Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
BUS. L. TODAY (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2012/08/03_
cabral.html (discussing remedies available to secured parties upon default of the debtor).
116. See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (“Except as otherwise provided . . . a financing statement must be
filed to perfect all security interests and agricultural liens.”); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 114,
§ 22-10, at 779 (describing perfection by filing as “the most common method of performing a
security interest under Article 9”).
117. James W. Bowers, Some Economic Insights into Application of Payments Doctrine:
Walker-Thomas Revisited, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 229, 245 (2014).
118. See U.C.C. § 9-323 (addressing future advances).
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property assets.119 For example, the secured creditor may make additional
loans to the debtor pursuant to the agreement signed by the parties, and the
additional loans will be secured by the debtor’s existing collateral
property.120 There is no need for the parties to execute additional
agreements each time the secured creditor issues a new loan to the
debtor.121 Likewise, the parties may enter into an agreement wherein the
debtor will acquire new property after the execution date, and the newly
acquired property will serve as collateral to secure the original loan.122
Again, the parties will rely on the original agreement without signing any
new agreement to cover the newly acquired collateral property.123
Also, secured transactions law allows the lender to receive a security
interest in the debtor’s collateral property for an antecedent debt. Section
203 of UCC-9 states that a security interest is attached and enforceable
119. See id. § 9-322 (discussing conflicting security interests and priority therein). Specifically,
comment 5, example 4 states:
On February 1, A makes advances to Debtor under a security agreement covering
“all Debtor’s machinery, both existing and after-acquired.” A promptly files a
financing statement. On April 1, B takes a security interest in all Debtor’s
machinery, existing and after-acquired, to secure an outstanding loan. The
following day, B files a financing statement. On May 1, Debtor acquires a new
machine. When Debtor acquires rights in the new machine, both A and B acquire
security interests in the machine simultaneously. Both security interests are
perfected simultaneously. However, A has priority because A filed before B.
Id. § 9-322 cmt. 5, ex. 4.
120. Example 1 in Official Comment 3 of U.C.C. § 9-323 illustrates the common practice of
having the original security agreement and filed financing statement cover future advances or loans:
On February 1, A makes an advance secured by machinery in the debtor’s
possession and files a financing statement. On March 1, B makes an advance
secured by the same machinery and files a financing statement. On April 1, A
makes a further advance, under the original security agreement, against the same
machinery. A was the first to file and so, under the first-to-file-or-perfect
rule . . . A’s security interest has priority over B’s, both as to the February 1 and as
to the April 1 advance. It makes no difference whether A knows of B’s intervening
advance when A makes the second advance.
Id. § 9-323 cmt. 3 ex. 1; see also In re Smink, 276 B.R. 156, 166 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2001) (“The
future advance clause at issue clearly states that it will secure any future and additional advances on
the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust, as well as, any other debts incurred by the grantors,
or any of them, including those represented by, inter alia, subsequent promissory notes. This
particular future advance clause, albeit ‘boilerplate language,’ is clear and unambiguous.”).
121. See In re Smink, 276 B.R. at 166.
122. See, e.g., First Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 945 F. Supp. 2d 802, 811 (W.D. Ky. 2013)
(“[T]he UCC ‘shall be liberally construed and applied.’ Section 355.9–204 sets forth no
requirement for particular language in order to create an interest in after-acquired collateral.
Therefore, while the traditional ‘hereafter acquired’ language is not present, the language that is
present clearly indicates that future assets were intended to be secured.”).
123. Id.; U.C.C. § 9-204(a) (“Except as otherwise provided . . . a security agreement may
create or provide for a security interest in after-acquired collateral.”).
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between the secured party and the debtor when the secured party has given
value to the debtor, the debtor has a right to the collateral property, and the
debtor has authenticated a security agreement which contains a description
of the collateral.124 The “value” given by the secured party to the debtor
can be loans or credit extended to the debtor from the secured party125 or
preexisting debt the debtor owed to the secured party.126 To illustrate this,
assume a debtor has borrowed money from a lender and the loan is
originally unsecured. Later, the debtor grants the lender a security interest
in the debtor’s property to secure the debtor’s repayments of the loan to the
lender.127 Consequently, the security interest is enforceable between the
debtor and the secured lender, as all requirements under § 203 of UCC-9
are met. If the lender then perfects its security interest in the collateral
property by filing the financing statement in the correct filing office,128 the
perfected security interest is enforceable against any third party and attains
priority over junior secured creditors,129 bankruptcy trustees, and unsecured
creditors.130
Moreover, a lender obtaining security interest in the debtor’s property
for preexisting debt is itself not a fraudulent conveyance under state law.
Most states have modeled their fraudulent transfer statutes after the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA).131 Also, as noted previously, all
fifty states have adopted UCC-9.132 Texas and California, for example, are
124. See U.C.C. § 9-203.
125. See Sterling Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Bornstein (In re Metric Metals Int’l, Inc.),
20 B.R. 633, 637–38 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding the security interest had attached because “[t]he
“debtor signed a security agreement describing the collateral, the bank gave value to the debtor in
the form of loans and the debtor had property rights in the claims for tax refunds”).
126. See, e.g., Farmers & Merchs. State Bank v. Teveldal, 524 N.W.2d 874, 878 n.4 (S.D.
1994) (“[P]reexisting debt may supply ‘value’ for attachment of a security interest.”).
127. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Seminole v. Hooper, 104 S.W.3d 83, 84 (Tex. 2003);
Wyzard v. Goller, 28 Cal. Rptr. 608, 609 (Ct. App. 1994).
128. In addition to filing the financing statement, the secured party can utilize other methods of
perfection of security interest, depending on the types of collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-312(b)
(addressing perfection by taking possession of the collateral); id. § 9-304 (addressing perfection by
taking control of deposit accounts); id. § 9-305 (addressing perfection by taking control of
investment property); id. § 9-306 (addressing perfection by taking control of letter-of-credit rights).
129. See id. § 9-322 (addressing priority among conflicting security interests and agricultural
liens in the same collateral and setting forth rules for determining that priority).
130. See id. § 9-317 (stating that an unsecured security interest is subordinate to creditors who
have filed the financing statement or perfected the security interest). U.C.C. § 9-317 also provides
that a security interest that is perfected prior to a lien creditor’s interest perfection will have priority.
See id. § 9-317(a)(2) (providing that a security interest is subordinate to the rights of “a person that
becomes a lien creditor before the earlier of that time” (emphasis added)).
131. See CORNELL U. L. SCH., Uniform Business and Financial Laws Locator, LLI,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/vol7.html#frcon (last visited Dec. 12, 2014).
132. Changes to UCC Article 9 Effective July 1, 2013, CREDIT TODAY (July 2012),
http://www.credittoday.net/public/Changes-to-UCC-Article-9-Effective-July-1-2013.cfm (noting
that all fifty states have adopted the 2001 version of UCC-9); see also Bowers, supra note 117, at
245 (providing that “all states” have adopted the latest version of UCC-9).
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among the states that have adopted both UFTA and UCC-9.133 The Texas
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA) and the California Fraudulent
Transfer Law are virtually identical.134
For example, the Texas Supreme Court in First National Bank of
Seminole v. Hooper135 held that the insolvent debtor’s conveyance of its
property to the bank to further secure preexisting debt was not a fraudulent
transfer.136 On January 4, 1990, the bank originally loaned Ernest Thornton
$300,000, and Thornton granted the bank a security interest in the debtor’s
accounts, gas contracts, chattel paper, general intangibles, and
equipment.137 Over the next two years, the bank made an additional loan of
$100,000 to the debtor.138 In early 1993, Thornton was already insolvent.139
On March 30, 1993, Hooper & Sons Investment Company obtained a
$950,000 judgment against Thornton arising from a dispute between the
two parties.140 Two weeks later, while still insolvent and in disregard of the
Hoopers’ judgment, Thornton granted to the bank a security interest in
additional collateral, namely conveyance of a particular deed of trust in the
Owego system, to secure the preexisting debts.141 Soon thereafter, the bank
proceeded to foreclose on the collateral.142 The Hoopers then sued seeking
damages from the bank, alleging that Thornton’s conveyance of the Owego
property to secure antecedent debts while insolvent was fraudulent.143
Applying TUFTA, which was modeled after UFTA,144 the jury found
that Thornton defrauded the Hoopers when he conveyed the Owego
property to secure the preexisting debt to the bank. The jury found that
Thornton was indeed insolvent when he transferred the property to the
bank,145and the property was not exchanged for reasonably equivalent
value.146 Thus, the jury awarded the Hoopers $700,000.147
133. CREDIT TODAY, supra note 132; CORNELL U. L. SCH., supra note 131 (listing California
and Texas among the states that adopted the UFTA); see also Wyzard v. Goller, 28 Cal. Rptr. 608,
610–11 (Ct. App. 1994) (describing the history of the Uniform Fraudulent Act and California’s
adoption of the model law).
134. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.04(a)–(b) (West 2014), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 24.005(a)–(b) (West 2014).
135. 104 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. 2003).
136. See id. at 84; see also J. Richard White & Jeffrey T. Arnold, Real Property, 57 SMU L.
REV. 1157, 1167–68 (2004).
137. First Nat’l Bank of Seminole, 104 S.W.3d at 84.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 86 (“Our interpretation of the asset to be valued in this context comports with
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, upon which TUFTA was modeled.” (emphasis added)).
145. Id. at 84–85.
146. Id. at 85. Under TUFTA, a transfer is fraudulent if the debtor makes the transfer intending
to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a)(1) (West
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The bank eventually appealed the case to the Texas Supreme Court.
“[T]he bank [did] not challenge the jury’s findings that Thornton was
insolvent and intended to defraud the Hoopers” when Thornton transferred
the security interest in the additional property.148 The bank instead asserted
that “because the transfer was made to secure a valid antecedent debt,
reasonably equivalent value was given as a matter of law.”149 The court
recognized that in a secured transaction, from the debtor’s perspective “the
value of the interest in the collateral transferred to the creditor can never be
more than the amount of the debt. The value of the collateral is therefore
irrelevant to the ultimate question because the excess over the debt is not
lost to the debtor or other creditors.”150 Consequently, the court found that
in the present case, the value of the Owego collateral that Thornton had
conveyed to the bank “could not have been more than the amount of
Thornton’s debt to the Bank.”151 Accordingly, “the Bank gave reasonably
equivalent value for the deed of trust lien,” and the jury judgment for the
Hoopers therefore could not be sustained.152 In addition, the court noted
that there was no evidence that the bank intended to assist Thornton in
evading his creditors. The court held that there was no fraudulent transfer
as a matter of law because “the value of the interest in an asset transferred
for security is reasonably equivalent to the amount of the [preexisting] debt
that it secures.”153
The above decision illustrates that state courts, in interpreting the
conveyance of security interest in debtor’s property to satisfy an antecedent
debt, hold that the transfer does not amount to fraudulent conveyance.154
2014). Additionally, a transfer is also fraudulent—irrespective of the debtor’s intent—if the debtor
receives less than the asset’s reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer, and the
debtor:
(A) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which
the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the
business or transaction; or (B) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should
have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor’s ability to pay
as they became due.
See id. § 24.0005(a)(2)(A)–(B).
147. First Nat’l Bank of Seminole, 104 S.W.3d at 85.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 86 (quoting Anand v. Nat’l Republic Bank of Chi. (In re Anand), 210 B.R. 456, 459
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. Id. at 86–87.
152. Id. at 87.
153. Id. at 84; see also Martin v. McEvoy, No. 34254-1-I, 1996 WL 335996, at *4 (Wash. Ct.
App. June 17, 1996) (“To establish constructive fraud . . . the evidence must show that the debtor
did not receive reasonably equivalent value. Thus, if value was received and that value was
reasonably equivalent, constructive fraud cannot be show[n].”).
154. See also Mark S. Scarberry, A Critique of Congressional Proposals to Permit
Modification of Home Mortgages in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 635, 650 n.57 (2010)
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This type of transaction is widely prevalent. Even in cases where the debtor
is both insolvent and defrauding other creditors, the debtor’s grant of a
security interest to secure an antecedent debt is not fraudulent if the
transfer has been exchanged for reasonable equivalent value and there is no
evidence that the secured party is aiding the debtor in committing fraud.155
B. Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc.
The Federal Circuit similarly opined on a commercial law decision
involving patents in Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc.156 The
focus of the litigation was on security interest in patents.157 Amr Mohsen
was the founder of Aptix, a hardware-logic-emulation technology
company.158 In an effort to keep the company operational, Mohsen
personally made numerous loans to Aptix—totaling more than $9
million—in order to pay employees and other creditors.159 In exchange for
the loans, Aptix granted Mohsen a security interest in Aptix’s patents in
July 2000.160 Mohsen perfected the security interest in the patents by
following the filing requirement under California’s version of UCC-9 in
August 2000.161
Next, Aptix brought a patent infringement action against its competitor,
Quickturn. The district court dismissed the case in June 2000 and ordered
the parties to negotiate attorney’s fees resulting in a $4.2 million award for
Quickturn.162 The case was then appealed to the Federal Circuit, which
affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s ruling, and the
(noting that non-bankruptcy law allows “preferences to stand and does not consider them to be
fraudulent” and further that the law provides that “‘[v]alue is given for a transfer or an obligation if,
in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or
satisfied’” thus “rendering most payments of antecedent debts non-fraudulent” (alteration in
original) (quoting UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3(a) (1984)); Steven A. Beckelman & Daniel
P. D’Alessandro, Defending Claims of Fraudulent Transfers Against Lenders, 125 BANKING L.J.
512, 514–15 (2008) (stating that “where a lender deals with a borrower at arm’s length and receives
fair value, in the form of payment or a security interest, for any loan extended to the borrower,
securing or satisfaction of an antecedent debt will not constitute a fraudulent transfer under UFTA,
as an act to ‘hinder, delay or defraud any [other] creditor of the debtor’” and concluding that
“[t]herefore, as where a lender receives a security interest in an asset of a debtor that exceeds the
value of the debt itself, a transaction is not lacking good faith, or seen as an act to hinder, delay or
defraud, where the lender is aware that the borrower has other creditors” (alteration in original));
William F. Savino & David S. Widenor, Commercial Law, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 569, 618–19
(2006) (discussing New York law providing that the grant of security interest in exchange for an
antecedent debt is not a fraudulent transfer).
155. See First Nat’l Bank of Seminole, 104 S.W.3d at 85–87.
156. 148 F. App’x 924, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 925–26.
159. Id. at 926.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Id.
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parties subsequently entered into a payment agreement in 2002.163 Around
the same time, when Quickturn could not collect the payment of the
judgment, it levied Aptix’s assets. Mohsen then initiated a third party claim
to Aptix’s patent collateral property based on his already perfected security
interest from July 2000.164 Perceiving Mohsen’s third party claim to be a
“fraudulent scheme” to prevent recovery of its award against Aptix,
Quickturn moved to enforce judgment.165 The district court conducted an
evidentiary hearing and subsequently entered an order voiding Mohsen’s
security interest in the patents after finding that Aptix granted the security
interest to Mohsen with “actual intent . . . to hinder or delay satisfaction of
the judgment due” to Quickturn.166 Mohsen appealed to the Ninth Circuit
and eventually had the case transferred to the Federal Circuit.167
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The panel
majority voided Mohsen’s security interest in the patents because it
believed that Mohsen’s receipt of the security interest in the patents in
exchange for the loans that he had made to Aptix was for the purpose of
defrauding the other creditor, Quickturn.168 The court relied on the fact that
Aptix was insolvent when it granted a security interest in the patents to
Mohsen and the transfer occurred just before a substantial judgment was to
be entered against Aptix.169 The panel majority concluded that the security
interest was a fraudulent transfer,170 ignoring the reality that Mohsen had
made numerous antecedent loans to the struggling Aptix in order to keep
the company in operation because it could not obtain funding elsewhere to
pay employees and other creditors. The panel majority claimed that
because Mohsen did not receive security interest for some of his prior
loans to Aptix in the past, the security interest that he received in July 2000
in exchange for loans that he made to Aptix was a badge of fraud.171
C. The Federal Circuit’s New Law on Security Interest and
Fraudulent Conveyance
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Aptix Corp. shows its lack of
understanding of secured transaction law and fraudulent conveyances.
If the Federal Circuit had a better understanding of state laws on
secured transactions and fraudulent conveyances (as articulated, for
illustration purposes, in the Texas Supreme Court’s case in First
National Bank of Seminole) a different outcome would have been
expected. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit, with its weak grasp of
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 926–27.
See id. at 927.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 927–30.
Id. at 928.
See id. at 929.
Id.
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state commercial law, fails to recognize fundamental concepts in
commercial law.
Worse, the Federal Circuit claimed in Aptix Corp. that it applied
California law on secured transactions and fraudulent transfer.172 The
Aptix Corp. court, however, missed some pivotal legal principles. First,
the court was unaware that in secured transactions, debtors routinely
convey security interest to secure or satisfy antecedent debt. Indeed,
California’s law recognizes the legitimacy of the grant of a security
interest in property to secure antecedent debt, as reflected in the
codified statutes on fraudulent transfers.173 This means that under
California law, Aptix was allowed to grant a security interest in
property to secure antecedent loans provided to it by Mohsen. Second,
California law specifically notes that “a transfer for security is
ordinarily for a reasonably equivalent value notwithstanding a
discrepancy between the value of the asset transferred and the debt
secured, since the amount of the debt is the measure of the value of the
interest in the asset that is transferred.”174 It follows that as long as the
exchange between Aptix and Mohsen was for “a reasonably equivalent
value” and the amount of the debt—in this case the total loans were $9
million—was “the measure of the value of the asset that is transferred,”
there was no fraudulent transfer. Moreover, there was no dispute that the
value of the collateral assets was significantly less than the $9 million
loans.175 Accordingly, under California law, the grant of the security
interest in Aptix’s property to Mohsen for the security of the preexisting
loans of $9 million was not fraudulent.
In addition, the Federal Circuit failed to observe decisions rendered by
California bankruptcy courts that routinely address bankruptcy cases where
debtors are insolvent while they transfer assets to secure antecedent debts
172. Id. at 930.
173. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.03 (West 2014) (“Value is given for a transfer or an
obligation if, in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt
is secured or satisfied.”); see also TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.004(a) (West 2014)
(“[V]alue is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the transfer or obligation,
property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied.” (emphasis added)). Section
24.004(d) of TUFTA defines “reasonably equivalent value” as “includ[ing] without limitation, a
transfer or obligation that is within the range of values for which the transferor would have sold the
assets in ’n arm’s length transaction.” Id. § 24.004(d).
174. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.03 cmt. 3; see also id. § 3439.04 cmt. 3 (“The premise of this Act
is that when a transfer is for security only, the equity or value of the asset that exceeds the amount
of the debt secured remains available to unsecured creditors and thus cannot be regarded as the
subject of a fraudulent transfer merely because of the encumbrance resulting from an otherwise
valid security transfer. Disproportion between the value of the asset securing the debt and the size
of the debt secured does not, in the absence of circumstances indicating a purpose to hinder, delay,
or defraud creditors, constitute an impermissible hindrance to the enforcement of other creditors’
rights against the debtor-transferor.”); see, e.g., Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Holy Family Polish
Nat’l Catholic Church, Carnegie, 19 A.2d 360, 361 (Pa. 1941).
175. See Aptix Corp., 140 F. App’x at 930.
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or make payments to secured creditors. For example, in In re First Alliance
Mortgage Co.,176 the Central District of California ruled that:
Repayments of fully secured obligations—where a transfer
results in a dollar for dollar reduction in the debtor’s
liability—do not hinder, delay or defraud creditors [under
California Civil Code section 3439.04] because the transfers
do not put assets otherwise available in a bankruptcy
distribution out of their reach, do not result in a diminution of
the debtor’s estate, and therefore cannot be fraudulent.177
Likewise, in In re Walters,178 the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central
District of California stated that “[a] proportionate reduction in rights or
liability constitutes an exchange of reasonably equivalent value for
fraudulent transfer purposes under the Bankruptcy Code or California state
law.”179
Moreover, California law allows Aptix to grant a security interest to
Mohsen in preference to Quickturn. Indeed, California Code § 3432 states
that “[a] debtor may pay one creditor in preference to another, or may give
to one creditor security for the payment of his demand in preference to
another.”180 In other words, California law does not treat a grant of security
interest preference itself as a fraudulent transfer. California law clearly
establishes that it “has been the rule for over 400 years, since the Statute of
Elizabeth in 1571” that a transfer establishing a preference is not thereby
fraudulent.181
Also, as seen in Wyzard v. Goller,182 the grant of a security interest in
preference of one creditor to another is not a badge of fraud under
California law. In that case, Goller provided legal services to defend
Manning and his corporation, Varigon, in a law suit brought by Wyzard.183
Manning did not pay Goller for the legal services rendered for most of the
duration of the litigation.184 Later, as the litigation was concluding and a
large judgment was expected to be entered against the corporation,
Manning executed a promissory note to Goller, promising to pay the
amount he already owed to Goller, and granted Goller a security interest in

176. Austin v. Chisick (In re First Alliance Mortg. Co.), 298 B.R. 652 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d,
471 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006).
177. Id. at 665.
178. Marshack v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Walters), 163 B.R. 575 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994).
179. Id. at 581.
180. Aptix Corp., 140 F. App’x at 931 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3432 (West 2014)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
181. Wyzard v. Goller, 28 Cal. Rptr. 608, 609 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571));
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3432.
182. Wyzard, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 611–12.
183. Id. at 609.
184. Id.
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the two properties owned by Manning.185 As expected, Wyzard received a
judgment of $785,793.46 at the end of the litigation and “presumably”
recorded the abstract of judgment.186 Manning then filed for bankruptcy,187
and Goller subsequently foreclosed on the two property assets. Wyzard
brought an action against Goller, challenging the security interest in the
two property assets Goller received from Manning.188
The Wyzard court, in rejecting Wyzard’s challenge, noted from the
outset that even before 1872, under California law, a debtor may grant
security for the payment of his preexisting debt in preference to another
creditor.189 Further, California law has long permitted the insolvent debtor
to prefer one creditor over others.190 The court also observed that
California law, past and present, and other states’ law, all permit a debtor
to prefer one creditor over others.191 Specifically, the court pointed to a
leading case in this area that stated “a transfer made in good faith to secure
an antecedent debt is declared to be for fair consideration, and does not
amount to an act to ‘hinder, delay or defraud’ an unpreferred creditor.”192
Moreover, courts “start with the proposition that a preference as such is not
a fraudulent conveyance.”193 Accordingly, Manning’s grant of a security
interest to Goller to secure the antecedent debt, even though such a transfer
is a preference over Wyzard, is not itself a fraudulent conveyance.194
Next, the Wyzard court examined whether there was any evidence to
support Wyzard’s argument that “the circumstances of the transfer evoke
some of the ‘badges of fraud’ from which an intent to defraud may be
presumed.”195 The court stated that the noted indicia of fraud are:
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 609 n.1.
188. Id. at 610.
189. Id.
190. Id. The court observed that even before 1872 it had been recognized that a failing or
insolvent debtor could prefer one creditor over another. Id. (“[I]t is difficult to perceive how the
payment of a debt which [is] justly owed, and which was past due, can be tortured into an act to
hinder, delay, and defraud creditors” (alteration in original) (quoting Randall v. Buffington, 10 Cal.
491, 494 (1858)) (citing Wheaton v. Neville, 19 Cal. 41, 46 (1861)). “Subsequent cases continued
the judicial refusal to set aside a preferential transfer solely because it worked a preference.” Id.
(citing McGee v. Allen, 7 Cal. 2d 468, 474 (1936), Bradley v. Butchart, 217 Cal. 731, 744 (1933)).
191. Id. at 611–12.
192. Id. at 611 (quoting Irving Trust Co. v. Kaminsky, 19 F. Supp. 816, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1937)).
193. Id. (quoting Smith v. Whitman, 189 A.2d 15, 18 (N.J. 1963)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Bos. Trading Grp., Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1508 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating
that if a hypothetical debtor who owes $10,000 to A and $20,000 to B, but has only $8000, which
he uses to satisfy his debt to A, does not make “fraudulent conveyance” under the Uniform Act
because payment satisfies a debt owed to legitimate creditor then B“must find a remedy in
bankruptcy, or in some other, law”).
194. See Wyzard, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 612 (“We conclude that the transfer to Mr. Goller, in
payment for his legal services, while a preference, is not for that reason a transfer made to ‘hinder,
delay or defraud’ Mr. Wyzard.”).
195. Id.
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(a) Whether the transfer or obligation was to an insider; (b)
whether the debtor had retained possession or control of the
property transferred after the transfer; (c) whether the transfer
or obligation was disclosed or concealed; (d) whether the
debtor was sued or threatened with suit before the transfer
was made or obligation was incurred; (e) whether the transfer
was of substantially all the debtor’s assets; (f) whether the
debtor has absconded; (g) whether the debtor had removed or
concealed assets; (h) whether the value of the consideration
received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value
of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation
incurred; (i) whether the debtor was insolvent or became
insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation
was incurred; (j) whether the transfer had occurred shortly
before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and (k)
whether the debtor had transferred the essential assets of the
business to a lienor who had transferred the assets to an
insider of the debtor.196
Applying the above factors to the case, the Wyzard court noted that: (1)
the debtor, Manning in this case, had been successfully sued by Wyzard
before he made the transfer of security interest to Goller; (2) the transfer
was of substantially all of Manning’s assets; and (3) the transfer to Goller
occurred shortly before Wyzard obtained the judgment against Manning.197
These three factors, however, did not change the undisputed fact that
Manning owed Goller a substantial sum for the legal services and the
unpaid fees were secured by the two-property collateral.198 Therefore, the
court concluded that “the transfer to Mr. Goller, in payment for his legal
services, while a preference, is not for that reason a transfer made to
‘hinder, delay or defraud’ Mr. Wyzard.”199
The facts in Wyzard are similar to Aptix Corp.Yet, as explained above,
the Federal Circuit failed to understand state law on secured transactions,
preference, and fraudulent transfer under California statutes and case law.
The Federal Circuit, contrary to long-established California law, has
created new Federal Circuit law that the grant of a security interest for
preexisting debt is a badge of fraud of property conveyance. Specifically,
the Federal Circuit held that just because Mohsen received the security
interest from the debtor for the antecedent loans before the debtor faced a
judgment in favor of Quickturn, the transfer to Mohsen was fraudulent. In
196. Id. at 612 n.4. In 2004, the California legislature codified these indicia of fraud by adding
subsection (b) to § 3439.04 of the California Civil Code. See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design
Systems, Inc., 148 F. App’x 924, 928 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
197. Wyzard, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
198. See id. (noting that the arguable application of these factors did not “raise[] a triable issue
of material fact”).
199. Id.
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reaching its decision, the Federal Circuit ignored the fact that Aptix, the
company itself, could not obtain funding from any other sources. No one
except Mohsen had stepped up to provide the loans Aptix desperately
needed to pay its employees and essential creditors in order to continue to
operate as a business. Voiding Mohsen’s security interest, as the Federal
Circuit did, sends a chilling message to individuals who use their personal
resources in funding struggling companies in exchange for security interest
in these companies’ patents. Under the Federal Circuit security interest
law, these individuals will stop providing such funding because their
acceptance of security interest in patents for the loans will be immediately
viewed as a badge of fraud and subject to the Federal Circuit’s scrutiny,
which disregards well-established state law on secured transactions and
fraudulent transfers.200
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS IN BANKRUPTCY AND THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S NEW TRUST LAW
This Part discusses the Federal Circuit’s overreach in cases concerning
liquidating a trust formed under a bankruptcy confirmation or liquidation
plan. It examines the relationship between the trust and its beneficiary as
well as existing state law in the area. It then presents a contrary Federal
Circuit case in this area and critiques the decision.
A. The Role of Liquidating Trust Created in Bankruptcy
In Chapter 11 Reorganization under bankruptcy law, the creation of a
liquidating trust has become common.201 The liquidating trust is generally
created to pursue causes of action for its beneficiaries, to oversee various
litigation and tax matters, to prosecute avoidance actions, or to complete
distributions to unsecured creditors.202 In other words, a liquidating trust,
200. See Gugliuzza, supra note 110, at 1819 (“According to recent opinions by some Federal
Circuit judges, the court has improperly leveraged choice-of-law doctrine to expand the scope of
federal common law and restrict the scope of state contract law. This dispute over choice of law
might be the next doctrinal battle within the Federal Circuit’s federalism relationship.” (footnote
omitted)).
201. See Chad P. Pugatch et al., The Lost Art of Chapter 11 Reorganization, 19 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 39, 61–62 (2008) (tracing the “widespread phenomenon” of liquidating trusts in
bankruptcy reorganization). In fact, liquidating trusts are so common that bankruptcy courts have
observed certain common practices of legal advisors to the trusts. See Peltz v. Worldnet Corp. (In re
USN Commc’ns, Inc.), 280 B.R. 573, 600 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (noting the common practice
regarding liquidating trust and that the attorneys who had represented the unsecured creditors’
committee are often the same attorneys to represent the liquidating trustee post-confirmation, in
order to reduce cost).
202. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Midwest Coal Corp. (In re HNRC Dissolution Co.),
No. Civ.A.04-158HRW, 2005 WL 1972592, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 16, 2005) (stating that the
Liquidating Trust in the present case “was created to pursue causes of action for its beneficiaries,
the holders of allowed unsecured claims against the Debtor’s estates, and the Liquidating Trustee
has filed over 600 avoidance action complaints against third parties. . . . [T]he only tasks remaining
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as some critics have noted, is where a bankruptcy trustee has expanded its
power from the limited role of litigating claims belonging to the
bankruptcy estate, to litigating claims of the creditors in post-confirmation
plan against third parties.203
To be classified as a liquidating trust for tax purposes, an entity must
meet certain conditions set forth by the IRS Revenue Procedure.204 For
instance, the trust must be created pursuant to a confirmed plan under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.205 The primary purpose of the
liquidating trust is to liquidate the assets that have been transferred to the
trust.206 The trust is typically funded with some of the bankruptcy sale’s
proceeds and “vested with the [bankruptcy] estate’s litigation claims” that
would then be prosecuted for potential cash to be subsequently distributed
by the trustee to the beneficiaries.207 The liquidating trust, by law, has a
duration of not more than five years from its creation date.208 Any
extension of the trust’s existence beyond the statutory term must be
approved by the bankruptcy court that has jurisdiction over the trust.209
A liquidating trust is a state law trust that has become a useful tool for
Chapter 11 reorganization plans. The Third Circuit provided the following
are for the Liquidating Trust to oversee various litigation and tax matters, prosecute avoidance
actions on behalf of the remaining creditors, complete these appeals, and complete any distributions
to the unsecured creditors”).
203. See generally Andrew J. Morris, Clarifying the Authority of Litigation Trusts: Why PostConfirmation Trustees Cannot Assert Creditors’ Claims Against Third Parties, 20 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 589 (2012) (offering a critique of the expansion of liquidating/litigation trusts).
204. See Paul Kugler et al., A Solid Overview of Liquidating Trusts, KPMG (Sept. 24, 2012),
http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/taxnewsflash/Documents/ussep24-liquidating-trusts.pdf.
205. Id.
206. See Rev. Proc. 94-45, 1994-2 C.B. 684, 685 (“A ruling generally will be issued that an
entity is classified as a liquidating trust if the following conditions are met: . . . The trust is or will
be created pursuant to a confirmed plan under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code for the primary
purpose, as stated in its governing instrument, of liquidating the assets transferred to it with no
objective to continue or engage in the conduct of a trade or business, except to the extent reasonably
necessary to, and consistent with, the liquidating purpose of the trust.”).
207. Pugatch et al., supra note 201, at 63 (“[A] liquidating trust is funded with some or all of
the [bankruptcy] sale proceeds, and is vested with the estate’s litigation claims, which are then
prosecuted, and hopefully liquidated to cash, by the liquidating trustee for the benefit of the
creditors who, after confirmation, become the beneficiaries of the newly created trust.” (footnote
omitted)).
208. See Rev. Proc. 94-45, 1994-2 C.B. 684, 685.
209. Id. (“The trust instrument must contain a fixed or determinable termination date that is
generally not more than 5 years from the date of creation of the trust and that is reasonable based on
all the facts and circumstances. If warranted by the facts and circumstances, provided for in the plan
and trust instrument, and subject to the approval of the bankruptcy court with jurisdiction over the
case upon a finding that the extension is necessary to the liquidating purpose of the trust, the term
of the trust may be extended for a finite term based on its particular facts and circumstances. The
trust instrument must require that each extension be approved by the court within 6 months of the
beginning of the extended term.”).
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observation regarding Chapter 11 plans in In re Insilco Technologies210:
While we typically think of Chapter 11 as the
“reorganization” section of the Bankruptcy Code (as opposed
to Chapter 7, the “liquidation” section), it is not uncommon
for debtors to use the Chapter 11 process to liquidate. This is
because Chapter 11 provides more flexibility and control in
determining how to go about selling off the various aspects of
the debtor’s business and distributing the proceeds. A typical
mechanism for effecting a Chapter 11 liquidation is the
creation of a “liquidating trust”—a state-law trust managed
by a group of creditors that succeeds to the debtor’s assets
and administers the liquidation and distribution process.211
For example, in Holloway v. Dane,212 the court observed that in the
related Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, the liquidating trust established
pursuant to the debtor’s reorganization plan was formed “for the purpose
of recovering, administering and distributing estate assets for the benefit of
unsecured creditors.”213 The liquidating trust in that case commenced an
adversary proceeding against numerous corporate defendants for their
alleged corporate misdeeds.214
Similarly, in WRT Creditors Liquidation Trust v. C.I.B.C. Oppenheimer
Corp.,215 under the confirmed reorganization plan, the bankruptcy court
approved the Plan and the Liquidating Trust Agreement in which the
debtor’s present and future litigation claims, rights of action, suits, or
proceedings were transferred to the WRT Trust for the benefit of the
unsecured creditors.216 The WRT Trust also received the right to solely
coordinate the prosecution and settlement of litigation on behalf of and for
the benefit of the beneficiaries and to distribute the proceeds to the
beneficiaries.217 Thereafter, the WRT Trust brought at least nineteen
adversarial proceedings against different defendants, asserting causes of
action under state law and the Bankruptcy Code.218
Importantly, as seen in the trust examples above, liquidating trusts are
created for the beneficiaries. Indeed, to be classified as a liquidating trust,
210. 480 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2007).
211. Id. at 214 n.1 (emphasis added).
212. 316 B.R. 876 (S.D. Miss. 2004).
213. Id. at 878.
214. See id. at 878–79.
215. See 75 F. Supp. 2d 596 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
216. Id. at 600 (“The Plan assigned all the debtor’s ‘Causes of Action’ to the WRT Trust,
defining that term as ‘[a]ny and all causes of action, claims, rights of action, suits or proceedings,
whether in law or equity, whether known or unknown, which have been or could be asserted, by the
Debtor.’” (alteration in original)).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 601.
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the confirmed plan and any separate trust documents “must provide that the
beneficiaries of the trust will be treated as the grantors and deemed owners
of the trust.”219 Structurally, the liquidating trust is administered by a
liquidating trustee who must adhere to the duty described in the trust
agreement and the duty of loyalty and good faith in operating the trust for
the benefit of the beneficiaries.220
Who are the beneficiaries of a liquidating trust? The beneficiaries of the
liquidating trust are typically the creditors of the bankruptcy estate who
“trade their creditor status for a beneficiary interest in the trust”221 and are
generally identified in the confirmed plan and trust documents.222 The
beneficiaries of a trust are therefore the deemed “owners of the trust”
res.223 The trustee is typically appointed to oversee the liquidating trust in
bringing claims belonging to creditors against third parties in a postconfirmation plan.224 A question arises as to whether the beneficiaries, as
owners of the liquidating trust, have standing to bring litigation against
third parties in cases involving the property held by the trust.
B. Morrow v. Microsoft Corp.
Another decision rendered by the Federal Circuit, Morrow v. Microsoft
Corp.,225 centers on a bankruptcy asset, namely, a patent held by a
liquidating trust for the beneficiary creditors.226 The At Home Corporation
(AHC) was in bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy court ordered a plan wherein
several trusts were formed as successors to AHC to orderly liquidate the
assets in September 2002.227 The liquidation plan created a two-tiered trust
system wherein the General Unsecured Creditors’ Liquidating Trust
(GUCLT) was established to function as trustee to various creditors, and
the At Home Liquidating Trust (AHLT) was established as trustee to

219. Rev. Proc. 94-45, 1994-2 C.B. 684, 685.
220. See Dennis Montali et al., Recent Developments in Business Bankruptcy—2010, 31 CAL.
BANKR. J. 665, 684 (2011) (providing an example of a liquidating trustee who was found by a
bankruptcy court to have “breached (1) his duty of loyalty and good faith, (2) the trust agreement,
(3) his duty to keep and render accounts, (4) his duty to preserve trust assets and pursue claims of
the trust, and (5) his duty to keep trust assets separate”); see also Harrow v. Street (In re Fruehauf
Trailer Corp.), 431 B.R. 838, 850–52 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, No. CV 10–02312 DDP, 2011
WL 2014672 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2011).
221. Pugatch et al., supra note 201, at 61.
222. Rev. Proc. 94-45, 1994-2 C.B. 684, 685.
223. Id.
224. See Morris, supra note 203, at 600–01 (“Typically, a plan establishes a state-law trust to
hold the estate’s claims against third parties and appoints the bankruptcy trustee as the postconfirmation trustee who is charged to litigate those claims.”).
225. 499 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
226. Id. at 1335.
227. Id.
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GUCLT to facilitate IP infringement litigation on GUCLT’s behalf.228 This
meant AHLT was the trustee and GUCLT was the beneficiary. In other
words, AHLT held only bare title to the assets, and GUCLT possessed all
the proprietary interest and ownership rights to the assets.229 That also
meant that, pursuant to the liquidation plan, the patent asset was owned by
GUCLT and merely held by AHLT in trust and for the benefit of
GUCLT.230
Subsequently, GUCLT brought a patent infringement action against
Microsoft. Microsoft challenged GUCLT’s standing to bring the patent
suit, and the district court found that GUCLT had standing to sue under
bankruptcy law principles and “based on its trust beneficiary status.”231
Three years later, in 2006, upon completion of the discovery process in the
litigation, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment on invalidity and
infringement issues.232 The district court ruled for Microsoft on invalidity
and noninfringement.233 Thereafter, the parties appealed to the Federal
Circuit.234
The Federal Circuit focused on whether GUCLT had standing to sue
Microsoft for the patent infringement. The panel majority framed the
question as “how [do] bankruptcy or trust law relationships affect the
standing analysis in a patent infringement case” and noted that the issue
was “a question of first impression in this court.”235 The panel majority
held that GUCLT’s rights under the liquidation plan failed to situate
GUCLT in one of the Federal Circuit’s two categories where it could sue in
its own name or maintain a co-plaintiff status in the infringement suit.236
Specifically, the panel majority held that GUCLT had no standing to sue
Microsoft for patent infringement under patent law even though AHLT had
been added as a co-plaintiff.237 The majority vacated the infringement
judgment below and reversed the district court’s decision for lack of
standing.238
Consequently, after three costly years of litigating the patent
infringement case and after the district court made its findings on the
merits, the Federal Circuit brushed everything aside to focus on standing.
By ruling that GUCLT lacked standing, the Federal Circuit eviscerated the
district court’s findings on invalidity and infringement. This means the
228. See Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Plaintiff/Counterclaim
Defendant-Appellant Hank M. Spacone at 2, Morrow, 499 F.3d 1332.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 2, 4.
231. Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1335.
232. Id. at 1336.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1339–44.
237. See id. at 1344.
238. Id.
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only choice GUCLT and AHLT plaintiffs have is to restart the case all over
in the district court. Most troublesome of all, under the panel majority’s
ruling, GUCLT cannot be a plaintiff in the new patent infringement case.
Likewise, both GUCLT and AHLT together cannot be plaintiffs in the new
patent infringement suit if the suit is subsequently initiated in the district
court!
Who then can be the proper plaintiff? It seems from the Federal
Circuit’s decision that AHLT is the proper plaintiff because it owns the
patent. But the liquidation plan endorsed by the bankruptcy court does not
grant AHLT the right to bring patent infringement litigation,239 and that
means AHLT cannot be the plaintiff. Moreover, the Federal Circuit
ignored the fact that AHLT had already been added as a plaintiff in the
patent litigation when the court vacated the entire judgment on the merits
of invalidity and noninfringement. What good did it or would it accomplish
when the “proper” plaintiff, AHLT, had already been overlooked by the
Circuit? Most costly, of course, is to restart the entire litigation with AHLT
as the sole plaintiff so the district court will subsequently reach the same
results on the merits of invalidity and noninfringement. The parties will
waste precious resources to litigate the case at the district court level, and
then to appeal the case to the Federal Circuit again? Surely, precious
financial and judicial resources will be wasted because GUCLT cannot
even be a co-plaintiff pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s decision. While the
Federal Circuit denied GUCLT the right to be a co-plaintiff in the patent
infringement litigation, the liquidation plan approved by the bankruptcy
court vested GUCLT with just that right. Needless to say, the Federal
Circuit has created chaos in the name of patent stewardship.
C. The Federal Circuit’s New Trust Law
How did the Federal Circuit cause this disarray? In reaching its
decision, the majority relied on its own view of the facts and understanding
of trust law, particularly its own understanding of liquidating trusts created
in post-confirmation bankruptcy proceedings. The panel majority naively
believed that the liquidation plan merely created GUCLT and AHLT as
trusts for purposes of distributing the assets and rights among the trusts.240
The majority mechanically recounted that GUCLT received the rights to
bring various causes of action for the estate, including claims of IP
infringement.241 AHLT was “in charge of conducting the administrative
wind-down of the company’s business” and was given the ownership right
in the IP by default.242 Therefore, AHLT “received legal title to
239. Id. at 1335 (noting that GUCLT “received the rights to all other causes of action,”
including “claims for misappropriation or infringement of AHC’s intellectual property rights”
(emphasis added)).
240. See id. (“The liquidation plan distributed certain assets and rights among the trusts.”).
241. Id.
242. Id.
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the . . . patent under the liquidation plan though it did not have the right to
sue third parties for infringement of the patent.”243 The majority mentioned
that “AHLT’s assets were to be managed for the benefit of the bondholders
and the general creditors of . . . GUCLT.”244 What the majority ignored or
misunderstood was the relationship between GUCLT and AHLT.
The relationship between the litigation trust GUCLT and liquidating
trust AHLT was itself also a trust wherein AHLT was the trustee and
GUCLT was the beneficiary. A careful examination of the liquidation plan
reveals that the plan created a two-tiered trust system. In the first tier,
GUCLT functioned as a trustee to the general creditors. In the second tier,
AHLT functioned as a trustee to GUCLT and was the liquidation plan
agent facilitating patent infringement litigation for the benefit of the
beneficiary GUCLT. More precisely, AHLT held the patent only in bare
title and that is why the liquidation plan approved by the bankruptcy court
dictated that while AHLT held the bare title, it had no power to initiate
patent infringement litigation.245 This system is how the liquidation plan
empowered GUCLT with the right to bring a patent infringement suit.
GUCLT, as the beneficiary, ultimately had all the benefits and proprietary
interest or ownership rights to the patent.246 In other words, from the
liquidation plan approved by the bankruptcy court, for the trust relationship
to work as created under the plan, the patent is truly owned by the
beneficiary GUCLT and merely held by AHLT in trust and for the benefit
of the beneficiary GUCLT.247 Therefore, either GUCLT by itself, or
GUCLT and AHLT together, should have been permitted to bring the
patent infringement action against third party infringers, as they were
created and approved by the bankruptcy court to liquidate the property
assets per the confirmation plan. The majority ignored the trust relationship
and viewed it strictly through the lens of patent law, holding that GUCLT
and AHLT could not maintain the patent suit, as they could not be squarely
categorized as co-plaintiffs for standing purposes.248
Additionally, the majority had its own understanding of patent law and
forced the trust relationship between GUCLT and AHLT into its rigid
categories. The majority created three categories of plaintiffs in analyzing
constitutional standing issues in patent infringement.249 The majority centered
its division of the categories and “constitutional injury in fact” on whether the
plaintiff possessed “exclusionary rights.”250 The “exclusionary rights”
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See Petition for Panel Rehearing, supra note 228, at 1–3.
246. Id. at 4.
247. See id. at 2–4.
248. Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1343–44.
249. Id. at 1339.
250. Id. (“The party holding the exclusionary rights to the patent suffers legal injury in fact
under the [patent] statute.”).
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identified by the majority were the “legal right to exclude others from
making, using, selling, or offering to sell the patented invention . . . or
importing the invention.”251 Specifically, the first category included a
patentee who holds “all the exclusionary rights” and “suffers constitutional
injury in fact” from patent infringement and therefore could bring
infringement suits in its own name.252 Under the first category, GUCLT
obviously would not have standing to bring the patent infringement action
against Microsoft in its own name as it was not the patentee.
The second category of plaintiffs, the majority asserted, “hold
exclusionary rights . . . but not all substantial rights to the patent.”253 The
majority, however, failed to explain the meaning of a plaintiff with all
exclusionary rights, but without all substantial rights. Did the majority
mean exclusionary rights are substantial rights? Do exclusionary rights
cover substantial rights? The majority merely stated that the plaintiffs in
the second category were the exclusive licensees who suffered injury
caused by any party that “makes, uses, sells, offers to sell, or imports the
patented invention.”254 The majority announced that the second category of
plaintiffs could bring patent infringement suits in their own name but had
to include the patentee as a co-plaintiff “to satisfy prudential standing
concerns.”255 Did the majority mean that plaintiffs in the second category
fulfill the constitutional standing requirement on their own and that
including the patentee as a co-plaintiff has nothing to do with
constitutional standing, but prudential standing? Did the majority mean
that the second category of plaintiffs must satisfy both constitutional
standing and prudential standing concerns, and by adding the patentee
AHLT as co-plaintiff, both are now met?
Peculiarly, under the second category, the majority denied GUCLT
standing to maintain the patent infringement litigation against Microsoft,
even after AHLT was brought into the action as a co-plaintiff to the suit.256
The majority pointedly did not give both GUCLT and AHLT the right to
maintain patent infringement litigation for lack of standing. Specifically,
the majority asserted that there was a lack of constitutional standing,
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1339–40.
253. Id. at 1340.
254. Id. (“As the grantee of exclusionary rights, this plaintiff is injured by any party that
makes, uses, sells, offers to sell, or imports the patented invention. Parties that hold the
exclusionary rights are often identified as exclusive licensees, because the grant of an exclusive
license to make, use, or sell the patented invention carries with it the right to prevent others from
practicing the invention.” (citations omitted)).
255. Id. (“[T]hese exclusionary rights ‘must be enforced through or in the name of the owner
of the patent,’ and the patentee who transferred these exclusionary interests is usually joined to
satisfy prudential standing concerns.” (quoting Indep. Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 269
U.S. 459, 467, 469 (1926))).
256. See id. at 1344 (“Joining the legal title holder only satisfies prudential standing
requirements. It cannot cure constitutional standing deficiencies.”).
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not prudential standing.257 In other words, it is unclear what the
majority really meant!
Consequently, without a good understanding of trust law and the
relationship between a trust and its beneficiaries as owners of the
property held by the trust, the Federal Circuit thrust GUCLT, the
owners of the patents held by AHLT, into one of its rigid categories. It
denied both GUCLT and AHLT the right to prosecute their patents
against the infringer since they could not fit in any of the court’s
categories. Both GUCLT and AHLT were liquidating trusts in the postconfirmation plan phase of bankruptcy, which means they were
temporal in scope for the purpose of liquidating the property on behalf
of the creditors. These liquidating trusts have suffered a harsh fate as a
result of the Federal Circuit’s decision; they will not be able to defend
or prosecute the property that they were specifically created to serve.
Under the Federal Circuit’s new trust law, liquidating trusts should
never be created because they will never be allowed to bring a patent
infringement suit against a third party. Alleged infringers will have
the upper hand and will be permitted to continue the alleged
infringing activities because the liquidating trusts are powerless
without standing to maintain suit. Confirmation plans in bankruptcy
proceedings will now be reluctant to create liquidating trusts
involving patent assets for fear of the Federal Circuit’s overreaching
its patent jurisdiction to prohibit them from bringing patent
infringement litigation against alleged infringers. What good will the
Federal Circuit’s new trust law do for state trusts? Hardly any can be
identified, except to reinforce the banner of patent exceptionalism in
the name of patent stewardship.258
IV. RESPECTING FEDERALISM PRINCIPLES IN STEWARDSHIP OF
PATENT LAW
Federalism is a bedrock principle of governance in the United States.259
Matters of state law must be left to the sovereignty of the state, as dictated
257. Id.
258. See id. at 1337 (“[T]he patent statutes have long been recognized as the law that governs who
has the right to bring suit for patent infringement, even when patent rights have been transferred as a result
of bankruptcy or proceedings in equity.”). The panel majority’s ruling has its own critics as seen in Judge
Sharon Prost’s vigorous dissenting opinion. See id. at 1344–48 (Prost, J., dissenting).
259. See, e.g., Jessica L. Hannah & Kevan P. McLaughlin, Comment, “On Certiorari to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals”: The Supreme Court’s Review of Ninth Circuit Cases During the October 2006
Term, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 409, 422 (2008) (“One of the bedrock concepts of American
government is the delineation of powers between the federal government and the states, i.e., the legal
relationship called federalism.”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., A Neo-Federalist Analysis of Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1517 (2007) (“In exercising this [judicial] discretion, federal courts
should implement a bedrock tenet of judicial federalism: They have primary responsibility over federal
law, whereas state tribunals control state law.”); see also Pac. Co. v. Johnson, 285 U.S. 480, 493 (1932)
(“[I]n our dual system of government, action of the one government in the proper exercise of its sovereign
powers, regarded as innocuous and permissible notwithstanding its incidental effects on the other, may
become offensive and be deemed forbidden if it discriminates against the other.”).
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by the Constitution.260 Commercial laws, including laws governing
contracts, property transfers, secured transactions, fraudulent conveyances,
and trusts, are strictly within the purview of the state.261 No federal court
has the authority, in the absence of a conflicting federal law or policy, to
unilaterally extend its reach into matters regulated by state law.262
Under the Supreme Court’s precedent, federal courts must act with
utmost care in imposing judicial preemption of state law.263 As a result,
judicial preemption is justified only where there is conflict between federal
law and state law.264 The requirement of such a conflict as a precondition
controls both the permissibility of judicial preemption and “the scope of
judicial displacement of state rules.”265 Further, even in the patent area
where there is federal legislation, courts must still be mindful that
260. For example, “police matters within the states” are left to the states, “in light of the
bedrock principle of federalism.” Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort
Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830, 888 (2006); see also Elizabeth B. Wydra, Constitutional
Problems with Judicial Takings Doctrine and the Supreme Court’s Decision in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 109, 120 (2011) (“States’ development of property
law relies in many ways on the interaction between background common law principles and
legislation. The [federal] judicial takings theory threatens to violate bedrock principles of federalism
and disturb the incremental development of state property law by state and local policy makers and
state courts.”).
261. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 597 (2002)
(“Federalism is thus in many ways alive and well; state law also still controls most of the law of
torts, contracts and commercial law, domestic relations, and criminal law.”); Viva R. Moffat, SuperCopyright: Contracts, Preemption, and the Structure of Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 45, 97 (2007) (“[C]ontract law has been a matter of state law, and there are many good reasons
for this: basic principles of federalism and the desire to create laboratories of law, for example.”).
Cf. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A Critique of the
Supreme Court’s Theory That Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289,
1324 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court settled in early precedents that “state courts have
general jurisdiction, which includes final authority over their states’ laws and concurrent
jurisdiction over cases involving federal law”).
262. See O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87–88 (1994) (noting that the
permissibility and scope of the displacement of state rules are predicated on a conflict between
federal policy or interest and the use of state law).
263. Id. at 87 (“Our cases uniformly require the existence of such a conflict as a precondition
for recognition of a federal rule of decision.”); see Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 672
F.3d 1239, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
264. O’Melveny & Meyers, 512 U.S. at 87 (stating that precedents dictate that cases justifying
the “judicial creation of a special federal rule” to preempt state law are “‘few and restricted,’ limited
to situations where there is a ‘significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the
use of state law’” (citations omitted) (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) and
Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966))). The limitations as imposed by the
Supreme Court are due to the fact that federal courts, “unlike their state counterparts, are courts of
limited jurisdiction that have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers.” Id. at 90
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
265. Id. at 87–88 (“Not only the permissibility but also the scope of judicial displacement of
state rules turns upon such a conflict.”).
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“Congress acts . . . against the background of the total corpus juris of the
states”266 and therefore where there are no specific statutory provisions on
certain matters, courts must acknowledge that those matters “are
presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state law.”267
As explained in the Abraxis Bioscience dissent, the Federal Circuit
provided no justification for its judicial preemption of New York contract
law, the law selected by the sellers and acquirers in the complex assets
transfer.268 The Federal Circuit failed to identify any “significant conflict”
between federal patent law and New York state contract law, as required
by the Supreme Court.269 The Federal Circuit displaced state contract law
with its own precedents of patent assignments.270 The decision is improper
judicial preemption of state contract law.271 It is a complete disregard of
doctrinal federalism. Similarly, in Aptix Corp., the Federal Circuit
extended its reach in secured transactions and fraudulent conveyances—
two areas that are exclusively within the provenance of state law—and
ignored long-established state law.272 The Federal Circuit arrogantly
brushed aside state commercial statutes for secured transactions, state
fraudulent conveyance statutes, and state decisional laws interpreting the
statutes.273 Again, the Federal Circuit provided no explanation and
justification for its judicial preemption.274 The Federal Circuit continued its
assault on doctrinal federalism in Morrow when it reached into the area of
state trust law and imposed its misunderstanding of liquidating trusts,
beneficiaries as the true owners of the trust res, and the trustee’s function
for the benefits of the true owners.275
Nothing good can come from the Federal Circuit’s disregard of
doctrinal federalism. Business entities, startups, investors, and commercial
lawyers face enormous uncertainty when the Federal Circuit extends its
reach into areas of well-established state law. The Federal Circuit must
heed the Supreme Court’s direction in judicial preemption and federalism.
In commandeering stewardship of patent law, the Federal Circuit has no
authority to exert its power in matters belonging to states. In today’s
economy, a commercial transaction—be it a sale of assets, a security
interest conveyance, or a liquidation trust—will often include patents. Just
because a commercial transaction includes patents does not allow the
Federal Circuit to exercise its patent jurisdiction to affect judicial
266. Wallis, 384 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
267. O’Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 85.
268. Abraxis Bioscience, 672 F.3d at1241 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
269. Id. (quoting O’Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 79) (internal quotation marks omitted).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 148 F. App’x 924, 931–32 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (Newman, J., dissenting).
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See supra Section III.C.
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preemption. Without articulating any significant conflict between federal
and state law or policy, the Federal Circuit must not inject its authority into
state law areas, creating costly results and unwarranted uncertainties. State
law is the product of vast experience and wisdom, and businesses have
long relied upon it to conduct their commercial transactions. The Federal
Circuit, or any other federal court, cannot ignore the benefit that the dual
sovereignty of doctrinal federalism provides.276 The destabilization of
federalism, evidenced in the Federal Circuit’s cases, must promptly end in
order to foster the richness of existing state law and preserve the vision of
governance as dictated by and in the Constitution.277
CONCLUSION
Since 1982, the Federal Circuit has positioned itself as the Patent Court
of the United States. Admirably, the Federal Circuit has produced an
influential body of patent law with impact beyond national boundaries.
However, the Federal Circuit’s overreach into commercial law under the
disguise of patent law is counterproductive. To maintain its stewardship of
patent law, the court should not invoke patent jurisdiction to rationalize its
decisions concerning commercial law that dramatically alter established
commercial law. Encroachment on commercial law, which is within the
provenance of state law, destabilizes federalism causing uncertainty in
state law areas. The Federal Circuit must restrain itself, as it has no
authority to inject itself into state law making.

276. See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71
B.U. L. REV. 685, 765–66 (1991) (“[R]ampant federal preemption forms an ominous threat to the
constricted space that remains to local and state politics.”).
277. Cf. Margaret Z. Johns, Should Blackwater and Halliburton Pay for the People They’ve
Killed? Or Are Government Contractors Entitled to a Common-Law, Combatant-Activities
Defense?, 80 TENN. L. REV. 347, 353 (2013) (“[B]edrock constitutional principles dictate that the
judicial branch should not recognize a combatant-activities defense that would improperly intrude
on state sovereignty in violation of federalism principles.”).
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